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Security Attacks Abusing Pulse-level Quantum Circuits

Chuanqi Xu, Jakub Szefer

TL;DR

This work presents the first thorough exploration of the attacks on the interface between gate-level and pulse-level quantum circuits and pulse-level quantum circuits themselves, and proposes a defense framework.

Abstract

This work presents the first thorough exploration of the attacks on the interface between gate-level and pulse-level quantum circuits and pulse-level quantum circuits themselves. Typically, quantum circuits and programs that execute on quantum computers, are defined using gate-level primitives. However, to improve the expressivity of quantum circuits and to allow better optimization, pulse-level circuits are now often used. The attacks presented in this work leverage the inconsistency between the gate-level description of the custom gate, and the actual, low-level pulse implementation of this gate. By manipulating the custom gate specification, this work proposes numerous attacks: qubit plunder, qubit block, qubit reorder, timing mismatch, frequency mismatch, phase mismatch, and waveform mismatch. This work demonstrates these attacks on the real quantum computer and simulator, and shows that most current software development kits are vulnerable to these new types of attacks. In the end, this work proposes a defense framework. The exploration of security and privacy issues of the rising pulse-level quantum circuits provides insight into the future development of secure quantum software development kits and quantum computer systems.

Security Attacks Abusing Pulse-level Quantum Circuits

TL;DR

This work presents the first thorough exploration of the attacks on the interface between gate-level and pulse-level quantum circuits and pulse-level quantum circuits themselves, and proposes a defense framework.

Abstract

This work presents the first thorough exploration of the attacks on the interface between gate-level and pulse-level quantum circuits and pulse-level quantum circuits themselves. Typically, quantum circuits and programs that execute on quantum computers, are defined using gate-level primitives. However, to improve the expressivity of quantum circuits and to allow better optimization, pulse-level circuits are now often used. The attacks presented in this work leverage the inconsistency between the gate-level description of the custom gate, and the actual, low-level pulse implementation of this gate. By manipulating the custom gate specification, this work proposes numerous attacks: qubit plunder, qubit block, qubit reorder, timing mismatch, frequency mismatch, phase mismatch, and waveform mismatch. This work demonstrates these attacks on the real quantum computer and simulator, and shows that most current software development kits are vulnerable to these new types of attacks. In the end, this work proposes a defense framework. The exploration of security and privacy issues of the rising pulse-level quantum circuits provides insight into the future development of secure quantum software development kits and quantum computer systems.
Paper Structure (36 sections, 2 equations, 9 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 36 sections, 2 equations, 9 figures, 1 table.

Figures (9)

  • Figure 1: The workflow of a quantum computer, demonstrating where the channel and pulse attacks proposed in this paper can occur. The quantum software development kit (Quantum SDK) is used to develop Quantum Circuits which are then executed on a Quantum Computer. The proposed attacks target the Quantum Circuit specification and can be deployed, among others, through supply chain attacks.
  • Figure 2: Illustration of our attacks.
  • Figure 3: Implementations of qubit flip with channel attacks and pulse attacks. The gray block in the channel attack section represents the custom gate that is manipulated in the attacks.
  • Figure 4: Example demonstration of the algorithm-specific attack on quantum teleportation.
  • Figure 5: Demonstration on 2-qubit Grover's search.
  • ...and 4 more figures