Certifiably Byzantine-Robust Federated Conformal Prediction
Mintong Kang, Zhen Lin, Jimeng Sun, Cao Xiao, Bo Li
TL;DR
This paper tackles the challenge of uncertainty quantification in federated learning when some clients may behave maliciously. It introduces Rob-FCP, a certifiably Byzantine-robust federated conformal prediction framework that detects and excludes malicious clients via a conformity-score-vector representation and a maliciousness score, while providing provable coverage guarantees. The authors also develop a malicious-client-number estimator based on EM to handle unknown numbers of attackers and prove precision bounds for the estimator. Empirically, Rob-FCP achieves coverage close to the nominal level across five datasets under diverse Byzantine attacks, outperforming standard FCP and validating the theoretical guarantees. The work enables safe, distributed uncertainty quantification in privacy-preserving settings, with implications for healthcare and other safety-critical domains.
Abstract
Conformal prediction has shown impressive capacity in constructing statistically rigorous prediction sets for machine learning models with exchangeable data samples. The siloed datasets, coupled with the escalating privacy concerns related to local data sharing, have inspired recent innovations extending conformal prediction into federated environments with distributed data samples. However, this framework for distributed uncertainty quantification is susceptible to Byzantine failures. A minor subset of malicious clients can significantly compromise the practicality of coverage guarantees. To address this vulnerability, we introduce a novel framework Rob-FCP, which executes robust federated conformal prediction, effectively countering malicious clients capable of reporting arbitrary statistics with the conformal calibration process. We theoretically provide the conformal coverage bound of Rob-FCP in the Byzantine setting and show that the coverage of Rob-FCP is asymptotically close to the desired coverage level. We also propose a malicious client number estimator to tackle a more challenging setting where the number of malicious clients is unknown to the defender and theoretically shows its effectiveness. We empirically demonstrate the robustness of Rob-FCP against diverse proportions of malicious clients under a variety of Byzantine attacks on five standard benchmark and real-world healthcare datasets.
