Is In-Context Learning in Large Language Models Bayesian? A Martingale Perspective
Fabian Falck, Ziyu Wang, Chris Holmes
TL;DR
The paper investigates whether in-context learning (ICL) in large language models is Bayesian by formalizing a martingale property that underpins exchangeability and a principled uncertainty decomposition. It derives diagnostics to test the martingale property and epistemic uncertainty, and evaluates several state-of-the-art LLMs on synthetic Bernoulli, Gaussian, and language tasks against Bayesian baselines. Across short horizons some models appear roughly consistent with the martingale property, but longer horizons reveal systematic, model-dependent deviations and Bayesian-scale misspecifications in epistemic uncertainty, falsifying the claim that ICL is Bayesian. The results underscore the importance of martingale-consistent conditioning for trustworthy uncertainty quantification and motivate development of models and prompts that respect exchangeability, especially in safety-critical applications.
Abstract
In-context learning (ICL) has emerged as a particularly remarkable characteristic of Large Language Models (LLM): given a pretrained LLM and an observed dataset, LLMs can make predictions for new data points from the same distribution without fine-tuning. Numerous works have postulated ICL as approximately Bayesian inference, rendering this a natural hypothesis. In this work, we analyse this hypothesis from a new angle through the martingale property, a fundamental requirement of a Bayesian learning system for exchangeable data. We show that the martingale property is a necessary condition for unambiguous predictions in such scenarios, and enables a principled, decomposed notion of uncertainty vital in trustworthy, safety-critical systems. We derive actionable checks with corresponding theory and test statistics which must hold if the martingale property is satisfied. We also examine if uncertainty in LLMs decreases as expected in Bayesian learning when more data is observed. In three experiments, we provide evidence for violations of the martingale property, and deviations from a Bayesian scaling behaviour of uncertainty, falsifying the hypothesis that ICL is Bayesian.
