Adversarial 3D Virtual Patches using Integrated Gradients
Chengzeng You, Zhongyuan Hau, Binbin Xu, Soteris Demetriou
TL;DR
This work introduces VP-LiDAR, a modular framework for attacking 3D LiDAR-based detectors by concentrating perturbations into sub-regions called virtual patches (VPs). It couples manual patches (MVPs) with a data-driven, IG-based saliency approach (Saliency-LiDAR, SALL) to create critical patches (CVPs) that significantly reduce spoofing area while maintaining or increasing attack effectiveness. CVPs achieve at least 15% higher ASR than MVPs and can reduce the spoofing footprint by roughly 50% for average-sized vehicles, with strong transferability across detectors. The study demonstrates the practical risk of LiDAR spoofing under footprint constraints and provides a pathway for developing targeted defenses, including universal saliency maps and patch-based vulnerability assessments.
Abstract
LiDAR sensors are widely used in autonomous vehicles to better perceive the environment. However, prior works have shown that LiDAR signals can be spoofed to hide real objects from 3D object detectors. This study explores the feasibility of reducing the required spoofing area through a novel object-hiding strategy based on virtual patches (VPs). We first manually design VPs (MVPs) and show that VP-focused attacks can achieve similar success rates with prior work but with a fraction of the required spoofing area. Then we design a framework Saliency-LiDAR (SALL), which can identify critical regions for LiDAR objects using Integrated Gradients. VPs crafted on critical regions (CVPs) reduce object detection recall by at least 15% compared to our baseline with an approximate 50% reduction in the spoofing area for vehicles of average size.
