A theory of neural emulators
Catalin C. Mitelut
TL;DR
The work introduces emulator theory (ET) and neural emulators as a scale- and mechanism-agnostic predictive framework for modeling neural dynamics and behavior, potentially extending to conscious states. It formalizes predictive emulators via joint time-series modeling with $E_t^b(w_{j,t,g})$ and $E_t^c(w_{j,t,g})$, where neural states evolve as $w_{j,t,g}=R(w_{j,t-1,g}, s_{t-1})$, and posits that sufficiently accurate emulators can reproduce source capacities without explicit mechanistic explanations. The authors propose the path-independent neural causality (PINC) framework, including ISI, PIC, and MSD, to justify exogenous generation of neural states and indistinguishability from ground-truth models, while distinguishing ideal versus scalable emulators. Limitations are discussed, notably the lack of content specification for conscious states and the need for empirical validation, data requirements, and architectural choices. Overall, ET offers a principled, prediction-centered paradigm for neuroscience that may unify cross-scale modeling and motivate new experiments on neural causality and consciousness in both biological and artificial systems.
Abstract
A central goal in neuroscience is to provide explanations for how animal nervous systems can generate actions and cognitive states such as consciousness while artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) seek to provide models that are increasingly better at prediction. Despite many decades of research we have made limited progress on providing neuroscience explanations yet there is an increased use of AI and ML methods in neuroscience for prediction of behavior and even cognitive states. Here we propose emulator theory (ET) and neural emulators as circuit- and scale-independent predictive models of biological brain activity and emulator theory (ET) as an alternative research paradigm in neuroscience. ET proposes that predictive models trained solely on neural dynamics and behaviors can generate functionally indistinguishable systems from their sources. That is, compared to the biological organisms which they model, emulators may achieve indistinguishable behavior and cognitive states - including consciousness - without any mechanistic explanations. We posit ET via several conjectures, discuss the nature of endogenous and exogenous activation of neural circuits, and discuss neural causality of phenomenal states. ET provides the conceptual and empirical framework for prediction-based models of neural dynamics and behavior without explicit representations of idiosyncratically evolved nervous systems.
