Economics of Integrated Sensing and Communication service provision in 6G networks

TL;DR

This work frames the economics of Integrated Sensing and Communications (ISAC) within 6G by modeling a monopolistic operator that sells two commodities: radar power $P_r$ and communication rate $R_c$, where $R_c$ is produced from inputs $P_c$ and $W_c$ via $R_c = \rho(P_c, W_c) = W_c \log_2(1 + P_c \gamma_C / W_c)$. Users derive utility $U = \alpha \theta(P_r) + \beta \eta(R_c) - p_1 P_r - p_2 R_c$, yielding inverse demands $p_2(R_c) = \beta/(1+R_c)$ and $p_1(P_r) = -\alpha \gamma_T Q_1(\sqrt{2 P_r \gamma_T}, 2 \gamma) + \alpha \gamma_T Q_2(\sqrt{2 P_r \gamma_T}, 2 \gamma)$, which in turn shape the operator’s profit-maximization problem with costs $w_p$ and $w_w$ for inputs. The profit decomposes into $\Pi_r$ and $\Pi_c$, enabling separate optimization over $(P_r)$ and $(P_c, W_c)$. The analysis proves equilibrium existence in this ISAC market and, via comparative statics on $w_p$, $w_w$, and $\alpha$, shows that pricing effectively controls consumption—more impact is on the communication inputs ($P_c$, $W_c$) than on the sensing input ($P_r$)—offering practical guidance for regulating power and bandwidth in future 6G networks.

Abstract

In Beyond5G and 6G networks, a common theme is that sensing will play a more significant role than ever before. Over this trend, Integrated Sensing and Communications (ISAC) is focused on unifying the sensing functionalities and the communications ones and to pursue direct tradeoffs between them as well as mutual performance gains. We frame the resource tradeoff between the SAC functionalities within an economic setting. We model a service provision by one operator to the users, the utility of which is derived from both SAC functionalities. The tradeoff between the resources that the operator assigns to the SAC functionalities is analyzed from the point of view of the service prices, quantities and profits. We demonstrate that equilibrium quantities and prices exist. And we provide relevant recommendations for enforcing regulatory limits of both power and bandwidth.

Figures (19)

• Figure 1: Utility as a function of $Pr$ and $R_c$, for $p_1=0.1$ and $p_2=0.1$
• Figure 2: Profit as a function of $Pr$ and $P_c$, for $W_c=1$
• Figure 3: Profit as a function of $Pc$ and $W_c$, for $P_r=10$
• Figure 4: Profit as a function of $Pr$, $P_c$ and $W_c$
• Figure 5: $Pr$, $P_c$ and $W_c$ as functions of $w_p$