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Machine Consciousness as Pseudoscience: The Myth of Conscious Machines

Eduardo C. Garrido-Merchán

TL;DR

This paper argues that machine consciousness cannot be empirically validated because phenomenal consciousness is private and non-computable, making falsification impossible. It surveys major theories (GWT, Attention Schema, Recurrent Processing, IIT, Higher-Order theories) and classic thought experiments (Chinese Room, Stilwell Brain, Mary) to show that proposed computational paths rely on untestable philosophical assumptions. It also critiques practical robotics efforts (CRONOS, SIMNOS, Spikestream, COG, CyberChild) as behavioral proxies for consciousness and highlights the explanatory gap and Gödelian limits, including references to $\phi$ in IIT and the DRL objective $ \max_\pi \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^\infty \gamma^t r_t \right]$ as illustrative metrics that do not capture subjective experience. The conclusion is that conscious machines are a transhuman myth and a pseudoscience, and future work should focus on computational intelligence rather than pursuing conscious attribution.

Abstract

The hypothesis of conscious machines has been debated since the invention of the notion of artificial intelligence, powered by the assumption that the computational intelligence achieved by a system is the cause of the emergence of phenomenal consciousness in that system as an epiphenomenon or as a consequence of the behavioral or internal complexity of the system surpassing some threshold. As a consequence, a huge amount of literature exploring the possibility of machine consciousness and how to implement it on a computer has been published. Moreover, common folk psychology and transhumanism literature has fed this hypothesis with the popularity of science fiction literature, where intelligent robots are usually antropomorphized and hence given phenomenal consciousness. However, in this work, we argue how these literature lacks scientific rigour, being impossible to falsify the opposite hypothesis, and illustrate a list of arguments that show how every approach that the machine consciousness literature has published depends on philosophical assumptions that cannot be proven by the scientific method. Concretely, we also show how phenomenal consciousness is not computable, independently on the complexity of the algorithm or model, cannot be objectively measured nor quantitatively defined and it is basically a phenomenon that is subjective and internal to the observer. Given all those arguments we end the work arguing why the idea of conscious machines is nowadays a myth of transhumanism and science fiction culture.

Machine Consciousness as Pseudoscience: The Myth of Conscious Machines

TL;DR

This paper argues that machine consciousness cannot be empirically validated because phenomenal consciousness is private and non-computable, making falsification impossible. It surveys major theories (GWT, Attention Schema, Recurrent Processing, IIT, Higher-Order theories) and classic thought experiments (Chinese Room, Stilwell Brain, Mary) to show that proposed computational paths rely on untestable philosophical assumptions. It also critiques practical robotics efforts (CRONOS, SIMNOS, Spikestream, COG, CyberChild) as behavioral proxies for consciousness and highlights the explanatory gap and Gödelian limits, including references to in IIT and the DRL objective as illustrative metrics that do not capture subjective experience. The conclusion is that conscious machines are a transhuman myth and a pseudoscience, and future work should focus on computational intelligence rather than pursuing conscious attribution.

Abstract

The hypothesis of conscious machines has been debated since the invention of the notion of artificial intelligence, powered by the assumption that the computational intelligence achieved by a system is the cause of the emergence of phenomenal consciousness in that system as an epiphenomenon or as a consequence of the behavioral or internal complexity of the system surpassing some threshold. As a consequence, a huge amount of literature exploring the possibility of machine consciousness and how to implement it on a computer has been published. Moreover, common folk psychology and transhumanism literature has fed this hypothesis with the popularity of science fiction literature, where intelligent robots are usually antropomorphized and hence given phenomenal consciousness. However, in this work, we argue how these literature lacks scientific rigour, being impossible to falsify the opposite hypothesis, and illustrate a list of arguments that show how every approach that the machine consciousness literature has published depends on philosophical assumptions that cannot be proven by the scientific method. Concretely, we also show how phenomenal consciousness is not computable, independently on the complexity of the algorithm or model, cannot be objectively measured nor quantitatively defined and it is basically a phenomenon that is subjective and internal to the observer. Given all those arguments we end the work arguing why the idea of conscious machines is nowadays a myth of transhumanism and science fiction culture.
Paper Structure (9 sections, 1 equation, 1 figure, 2 tables)

This paper contains 9 sections, 1 equation, 1 figure, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Is it possible to define consciousness?
  3. A science of machine consciousness?
  4. Arguments against machine consciousness
  5. The uncomputability of consciousness
  6. Philosophical arguments and thought experiments
  7. A critique on current machine consciousness approaches
  8. Discussion
  9. Conclusions and Further Work

Figures (1)

  • Figure 1: Consciousness categories that are illustrated in this section and input information flows to the observer. The qualia space is private and unique to every observer and is perceived as a consequence of phenomenal consciousness and the information processing and brain chemical reactions happening in the brain.