Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplication with Precomputation
Ryann Cartor, Rafael G. L. D'Oliveira, Salim El Rouayheb, Daniel Heinlein, David Karpuk, Alex Sprintson
TL;DR
The paper tackles secure distributed matrix multiplication with honest-but-curious servers by leveraging polynomial codes on an outer product partition: $A=[A_1;\dots;A_K]$, $B=[B_1;\dots;B_L]$, so $AB=\sum_{k,\ell} A_kB_\ell$. It introduces precomputation, allowing the user to offline compute the lower-right corner terms $\alpha_R+\beta_R$, thereby reducing the effective server count to $N^{\text{pre}}$ and enabling toleration of any fixed collusion fraction $\delta<1$. The work provides explicit formulas and bounds for $N^{\text{pre}}$ across the GASP_r family, including special cases $\mathsf{GASP}_{\text{small}}$ and $\mathsf{GASP}_{\text{big}}$, and analyzes time complexity with and without precomputation, showing concrete reductions (e.g., from $O(n^{2.6})$ to $O(n^{2.5})$ when $\omega=3$). Together, these results demonstrate the practical impact of offline preprocessing on security, efficiency, and scalability of SDMM in distributed settings.
Abstract
We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication in which a user wishes to compute the product of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers. We show how to construct polynomial schemes for the outer product partitioning which take advantage of the user's ability to precompute, and provide bounds for our technique. We show that precomputation allows for a reduction in the order of the time complexity for the cases where the number of colluding servers is a fixed percentage of the number of servers. Furthermore, with precomputation, any percentage (less than 100%) of collusions can be tolerated, compared to the upper limit of 50% for the case without precomputation.
