Secure Storage using Maximally Recoverable Locally Repairable Codes
Tim Janz, Hedongliang Liu, Rawad Bitar, Frank R. Kschischang
TL;DR
This paper addresses data secrecy in distributed storage systems encoded with Maximally Recoverable Locally Repairable Codes (MR-LRCs) under an $(l_1,l_2)$-eavesdropper. It proposes a per-group central processing unit (CPU) framework that uses local polynomials to enable secure global repairs and introduces two schemes, direct and forwarded, to control information leakage during repair. The authors derive explicit secrecy-dimension expressions for both repair schemes and show that positive secrecy dimension is achievable in several parameter regimes, improving security for MR-LRC-based DSSs. The work provides a practical repair framework with formal secrecy guarantees and points to future explorations of more general repair topologies and the full secrecy capacity of MR-LRC DSSs.
Abstract
This paper considers data secrecy in distributed storage systems (DSSs) using maximally recoverable locally repairable codes (MR-LRCs). Conventional MR-LRCs are in general not secure against eavesdroppers who can observe the transmitted data during a global repair operation. This work enables nonzero secrecy dimension of DSSs encoded by MR-LRCs through a new repair framework. The key idea is to associate each local group with a central processing unit (CPU), which aggregates and transmits the contribution from the intact nodes of their group to the CPU of a group needing a global repair. The aggregation is enabled by so-called local polynomials that can be generated independently in each group. Two different schemes -- direct repair and forwarded repair -- are considered, and their secrecy dimension using MR-LRCs is derived. Positive secrecy dimension is enabled for several parameter regimes.
