A Game-Theoretic Approach for PMU Deployment Against False Data Injection Attacks
Sajjad Maleki, Subhash Lakshminarayana, E. Veronica Belmega, Carsten Maple
TL;DR
The paper addresses the vulnerability of partially deployed PMU-enabled power grids to false data injection attacks. It models a two-player zero-sum game where a defender adds one PMU to create redundancy and a strategic attacker seeks to evade detection; the Nash equilibrium is computed using EXP3 without full knowledge of the opponent. Results on the IEEE 14-bus system show substantial improvements in FDIA detection rates compared with benchmarks, especially when zero-injection buses are present. The approach offers a practical, scalable defense that complements optimal PMU placement and can be extended to larger networks and multiple PMUs.
Abstract
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are used in the measurement, control and protection of power grids. However, deploying PMUs at every bus in a power system is prohibitively expensive, necessitating partial PMU placement that can ensure system observability with minimal units. One consequence of this economic approach is increased system vulnerability to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs). This paper proposes a zero-sum game-based approach to strategically place an additional PMU (following the initial optimal PMU deployment that ensures full observability) to bolster robustness against FDIAs by introducing redundancy in attack-susceptible areas. To compute the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution, we leverage a reinforcement learning algorithm that mitigates the need for complete knowledge of the opponent's actions. The proposed PMU deployment algorithm increases the detection rate of FDIA by 36% compared to benchmark algorithms.