Security Assessment of the LG Cryptosystem
Étienne Burle, Hervé Talé Kalachi, Freddy Lende Metouke, Ayoub Otmani
TL;DR
A cryptanalysis is presented showing that the security of several parameters of the LG cryptosystem have been overestimated and the existence of some weak keys allowing an attacker to find in polynomial time an alternative private key.
Abstract
The LG cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme in the rank metric using the recent family of $\lambdav-$Gabidulin codes and introduced in 2019 by Lau and Tan. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis showing that the security of several parameters of the scheme have been overestimated. We also show the existence of some weak keys allowing an attacker to find in polynomial time an alternative private key.
