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A Lightweight Security Solution for Mitigation of Hatchetman Attack in RPL-based 6LoWPAN

Girish Sharma, Jyoti Grover, Abhishek Verma

TL;DR

The study addresses Hatchetman attacks in RPL-based LLNs for IoT, showing that SRH tampering in Non-Storing mode can cause DoS and degrade metrics such as downward PDR and AE2ED. It develops a lightweight, non-cryptographic defense using a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, with dominant-strategy analysis leading to a PSNE$=$$(Dfp,Fp)$ for attacker detection, and it avoids cryptography. The approach is implemented and evaluated in the Contiki/COOJA environment on Z1 devices, using metrics like downward PDR, AE2ED, and control overhead. Results indicate the proposed method can mitigate the Hatchetman impact with low overhead, offering a practical security option for resource-constrained IoT deployments.

Abstract

In recent times, the Internet of Things (IoT) has a significant rise in industries, and we live in the era of Industry 4.0, where each device is connected to the Internet from small to big. These devices are Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabled and are capable of perspective analytics. By 2023, it's anticipated that over 14 billion smart devices will be available on the Internet. These applications operate in a wireless environment where memory, power, and other resource limitations apply to the nodes. In addition, the conventional routing method is ineffective in networks with limited resource devices, lossy links, and slow data rates. Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), a new routing protocol for such networks, was proposed by the IETF's ROLL group. RPL operates in two modes: Storing and Non-Storing. In Storing mode, each node have the information to reach to other node. In Non-Storing mode, the routing information lies with the root node only. The attacker may exploit the Non-Storing feature of the RPL. When the root node transmits User Datagram Protocol~(UDP) or control message packet to the child nodes, the routing information is stored in the extended header of the IPv6 packet. The attacker may modify the address from the source routing header which leads to Denial of Service (DoS) attack. This attack is RPL specific which is known as Hatchetman attack. This paper shows significant degradation in terms of network performance when an attacker exploits this feature. We also propose a lightweight mitigation of Hatchetman attack using game theoretic approach to detect the Hatchetman attack in IoT.

A Lightweight Security Solution for Mitigation of Hatchetman Attack in RPL-based 6LoWPAN

TL;DR

The study addresses Hatchetman attacks in RPL-based LLNs for IoT, showing that SRH tampering in Non-Storing mode can cause DoS and degrade metrics such as downward PDR and AE2ED. It develops a lightweight, non-cryptographic defense using a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, with dominant-strategy analysis leading to a PSNE for attacker detection, and it avoids cryptography. The approach is implemented and evaluated in the Contiki/COOJA environment on Z1 devices, using metrics like downward PDR, AE2ED, and control overhead. Results indicate the proposed method can mitigate the Hatchetman impact with low overhead, offering a practical security option for resource-constrained IoT deployments.

Abstract

In recent times, the Internet of Things (IoT) has a significant rise in industries, and we live in the era of Industry 4.0, where each device is connected to the Internet from small to big. These devices are Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabled and are capable of perspective analytics. By 2023, it's anticipated that over 14 billion smart devices will be available on the Internet. These applications operate in a wireless environment where memory, power, and other resource limitations apply to the nodes. In addition, the conventional routing method is ineffective in networks with limited resource devices, lossy links, and slow data rates. Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), a new routing protocol for such networks, was proposed by the IETF's ROLL group. RPL operates in two modes: Storing and Non-Storing. In Storing mode, each node have the information to reach to other node. In Non-Storing mode, the routing information lies with the root node only. The attacker may exploit the Non-Storing feature of the RPL. When the root node transmits User Datagram Protocol~(UDP) or control message packet to the child nodes, the routing information is stored in the extended header of the IPv6 packet. The attacker may modify the address from the source routing header which leads to Denial of Service (DoS) attack. This attack is RPL specific which is known as Hatchetman attack. This paper shows significant degradation in terms of network performance when an attacker exploits this feature. We also propose a lightweight mitigation of Hatchetman attack using game theoretic approach to detect the Hatchetman attack in IoT.
Paper Structure (18 sections, 4 equations, 9 figures, 2 tables, 2 algorithms)

This paper contains 18 sections, 4 equations, 9 figures, 2 tables, 2 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Contributions
  3. Organization
  4. Background
  5. Overview of RPL Protocol
  6. Hatchetman Attack in RPL
  7. Hatchetman Attack Implementation
  8. Experimental Setup
  9. Hatchetman Attack Algorithm
  10. System Model
  11. Mathematical Formulation
  12. Model Explanation
  13. Solution Approach
  14. Simulation Result
  15. Impact on Downward PDR
  16. ...and 3 more sections

Figures (9)

  • Figure 1: Normal Scenario: Packet Delivers Successfully (Downward PDR)
  • Figure 2: Attack Scenario: Packets do not reach node $n_4$ onwards
  • Figure 3: Hatchetman Attack Process
  • Figure 4: Two Players Game for Hatchetman Attack Detection
  • Figure 5: Hatchetman attack detection using matrix game approach
  • ...and 4 more figures