An Abundance of Katherines: The Game Theory of Baby Naming
Katy Blumer, Kate Donahue, Katie Fritz, Kate Ivanovich, Katherine Lee, Katie Luo, Cathy Meng, Katie Van Koevering
TL;DR
The paper frames baby naming as a tractable game where myopic parents choose names to match target popularities $\mu$ under a population distribution $f_i(a)$ and a meta-distribution $g(\mu)$. It analyzes satisfiability and stability, deriving conditions under which naming outcomes align with or diverge from parental desires, and introduces Extremely Reasonable Assumptions to simplify analysis. Through a power-law illustrative example, the authors show how the product of exponents $t\cdot t'$ shapes the evolution of name-frequency distributions, predicting oscillatory shifts for uncommon-name preferences and potential 'naming event horizons' for common-name biases. Complementary simulations and a Kat-GPT experiment illustrate the dynamics and underscore the paper’s playful yet insightful commentary on the futility and unpredictability of naming strategies, with practical implications for automated naming tools and language-model analyses.
Abstract
In this paper, we study the highly competitive arena of baby naming. Through making several Extremely Reasonable Assumptions (namely, that parents are myopic, perfectly knowledgeable agents who pick a name based solely on its uniqueness), we create a model which is not only tractable and clean, but also perfectly captures the real world. We then extend our investigation with numerical experiments, as well as analysis of large language model tools. We conclude by discussing avenues for future research.
