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Passivity-based Attack Identification and Mitigation with Event-triggered Observer Feedback and Switching Controller

Pushkal Purohit, Anoop Jain

TL;DR

This paper addresses the problem of output consensus in linear passive multi-agent systems under a False Data Injection (FDI) attack, considering the unavailability of complete state information and proposes a passivity-based approach for detecting FDI attacks on the system and a Zeno-free event-triggered observer-based switching controller.

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of output consensus in linear passive multi-agent systems under a False Data Injection (FDI) attack, considering the unavailability of complete state information. Our formulation relies on an event-based cryptographic authentication scheme for sensor integrity and considers FDI attacks at the actuator end, inspired by their practical nature and usages. For secure consensus, we propose (i) a passivity-based approach for detecting FDI attacks on the system and (ii) a Zeno-free event-triggered observer-based switching controller, which switches between the normal and the defense modes following an attack detection. We show that the closed-loop system achieves practical consensus under the controller's action in the defense mode. Simulation examples are provided to support the theoretical findings.

Passivity-based Attack Identification and Mitigation with Event-triggered Observer Feedback and Switching Controller

TL;DR

This paper addresses the problem of output consensus in linear passive multi-agent systems under a False Data Injection (FDI) attack, considering the unavailability of complete state information and proposes a passivity-based approach for detecting FDI attacks on the system and a Zeno-free event-triggered observer-based switching controller.

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of output consensus in linear passive multi-agent systems under a False Data Injection (FDI) attack, considering the unavailability of complete state information. Our formulation relies on an event-based cryptographic authentication scheme for sensor integrity and considers FDI attacks at the actuator end, inspired by their practical nature and usages. For secure consensus, we propose (i) a passivity-based approach for detecting FDI attacks on the system and (ii) a Zeno-free event-triggered observer-based switching controller, which switches between the normal and the defense modes following an attack detection. We show that the closed-loop system achieves practical consensus under the controller's action in the defense mode. Simulation examples are provided to support the theoretical findings.
Paper Structure (21 sections, 6 theorems, 26 equations, 9 figures)

This paper contains 21 sections, 6 theorems, 26 equations, 9 figures.

Key Result

Lemma 1

Consider the linear system where $x \in \mathbb{R}^m, u \in \mathbb{R}^p, y \in \mathbb{R}^p$ are state, input and output vectors, and $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}, B \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times p}$ and $C \in \mathbb{R}^{p \times m}$ are system, input and output matrices, respectively. The system sys is said to be passive if

Figures (9)

  • Figure 1: The $i^{\text{th}}$ agent under the FDI attack at the actuator end and with cryptographic authenticator at the sensor end.
  • Figure 2: Communication Topology.
  • Figure 3: Passivity inequality and attack signals (Case A).
  • Figure 4: Agents' output and events for observer (Case A).
  • Figure 5: Passivity inequality and attack signals (Case B).
  • ...and 4 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (15)

  • Definition 1: Passive System khalil2002nonlinear
  • Lemma 1: Implications of Passivity chopra2012output
  • Remark 1
  • Proposition 1
  • Theorem 1
  • proof
  • Theorem 2
  • proof
  • Definition 2
  • Theorem 3
  • ...and 5 more