Establishing a leader in a pairwise comparisons method
Jacek Szybowski, Konrad Kułakowski, Jiri Mazurek, Sebastian Ernst
TL;DR
This paper investigates how pairwise comparison methods used in MCDM can be manipulated to crown a chosen leader. It introduces two manipulation algorithms—greedy and bubble—built on the EQ procedure that equalizes two alternatives, and grounds the approach in a projection-based formulation with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. The authors define manipulation-difficulty metrics via the Ranking Stability Index and Average Ranking Stability Index and validate the methods with Monte Carlo simulations across varying matrix sizes and inconsistency levels. The results show that manipulation becomes harder with more alternatives, inconsistency has limited effect on ease of manipulation, and each manipulation facilitates subsequent ones, with scale preserved by the EQ process. The work provides insights into vulnerabilities of PC-based methods and informs defenses against strategic manipulation in decision support systems.
Abstract
Abstract Like electoral systems, decision-making methods are also vulnerable to manipulation by decision-makers. The ability to effectively defend against such threats can only come from thoroughly understanding the manipulation mechanisms. In the presented article, we show two algorithms that can be used to launch a manipulation attack. They allow for equating the weights of two selected alternatives in the pairwise comparison method and, consequently, choosing a leader. The theoretical considerations are accompanied by a Monte Carlo simulation showing the relationship between the size of the PC matrix, the degree of inconsistency, and the ease of manipulation. This work is a continuation of our previous research published in the paper (Szybowski et al., 2023)
