Secure Distributed Storage: Optimal Trade-Off Between Storage Rate and Privacy Leakage
Remi A. Chou, Joerg Kliewer
TL;DR
The paper addresses storing a file $F$ over $T$ servers with recoverability from any $\tau$ servers and privacy against any $z$ colluding servers, allowing leakage up to a fraction $\alpha$ of $H(F)$. It introduces and exploits a leakage-symmetric (uniform) secret sharing framework to optimize the distribution of shares and local randomness, deriving explicit, tight bounds on per-server share sizes and encoder randomness as functions of $\alpha$, $\tau$, and $z$. The main contribution is Theorem theconverse, which provides $\lambda_t^{\star}(\alpha,z,\tau)/H(F) = \max\left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\tau-z}, \frac{1}{\tau} \right)$ and $\rho^{\star}(\alpha,z,\tau)/H(F) = [z-\tau\alpha]^+/ (\tau-z)$, with matching achievability and converse proofs; the work also derives corollaries that recover classical ramp secret sharing limits and extends results to non-symmetric settings for the sum of shares and randomness. By optimizing over a set of admissible access functions, the authors show how controlled leakage enables substantial storage reductions, and they identify a threshold behavior: when $\alpha \ge z/\tau$, a simple ramp secret sharing with equal shares suffices. The findings advance the design of efficient, privacy-aware distributed storage systems and unify ramp secret sharing with broader access-function optimization under information-theoretic privacy.
Abstract
Consider the problem of storing data in a distributed manner over $T$ servers. Specifically, the data needs to (i) be recoverable from any $τ$ servers, and (ii) remain private from any $z$ colluding servers, where privacy is quantified in terms of mutual information between the data and all the information available at any $z$ colluding servers. For this model, our main results are (i) the fundamental trade-off between storage size and the level of desired privacy, and (ii) the optimal amount of local randomness necessary at the encoder. As a byproduct, our results provide an optimal lower bound on the individual share size of ramp secret sharing schemes under a more general leakage symmetry condition than the ones previously considered in the literature.
