Internet Sanctions on Russian Media: Actions and Effects

TL;DR

This paper analyzes EU sanctions on Russian media as a federated, government-driven intervention in internet infrastructure. Using multi-platform measurements (OONI, RIPE Atlas, EduVPN, Dataplane.org, NLNOG RING) and a custom sanctioned-resource list, it evaluates reachability, responses, handshakes, and connections to determine enforcement effectiveness. The findings show DNS-based blocking is the dominant mechanism, yet coverage is uneven across countries and outlets, with mirror-domain blocks and near-destination enforcement not consistently implemented or policed, leading to measurable yet incomplete reductions in access. The study highlights that while EU policy coordination occurred at the governmental level, technical coordination among operators remains limited, suggesting that digital sovereignty via sanctions has a tangible but distinctly limited impact on information flows and calls for closer organizational and technical alignment in future efforts.

Abstract

As a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Union (EU), through the notion of "digital sovereignty", imposed sanctions on organizations and individuals affiliated with the Russian Federation that prohibit broadcasting content, including online distribution. In this paper, we interrogate the implementation of these sanctions and interpret them as a means to translate the union of states' governmental edicts into effective technical countermeasures. Through longitudinal traffic analysis, we construct an understanding of how ISPs in different EU countries attempted to enforce these sanctions, and compare these implementations to similar measures in other western countries. We find a wide variation of blocking coverage, both internationally and within individual member states. We draw the conclusion that digital sovereignty through sanctions in the EU has a concrete but distinctly limited impact on information flows.

Figures (9)

• Figure 1: Longitudinal view of first-seen blocking of www.rt.com as observed by OONI. The dark-green is the total number of ASes for which blocking has been observed. 77% of these ASes enforce sanctions within 3 months.
• Figure 2: Methods used by ISPs in Europe to implement filtering (OONI Data)
• Figure 3: Measurement observations of three EduVPN institutions. Measurements marked with a "?" indicate the default limit of 30 hops was exceeded.
• Figure 4: HTTPS reachability success rate (2xx or 3xx HTTP response status code) from Dataplane.org VPs.
• Figure 5: Blocking page of a Dutch ISP. The text states "Upon the request of the EU [link to the Dutch version of cfsp_2022_03_01], this domain is currently blocked. We are aware of the discussion and objections about blocking websites, but we are complying with an explicit order from the government. Above all, we hope that the war in Ukraine will soon be over and we will try to help where needed." (translated by the authors).