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Provable Multi-Party Reinforcement Learning with Diverse Human Feedback

Huiying Zhong, Zhun Deng, Weijie J. Su, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang

TL;DR

This work initiates the theoretical study of multi-party RLHF that explicitly models the diverse preferences of multiple individuals and establishes sample complexity bounds, along with efficiency and fairness guarantees, for optimizing diverse social welfare functions such as Nash, Utilitarian, and Leximin welfare functions.

Abstract

Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) is an emerging paradigm to align models with human preferences. Typically, RLHF aggregates preferences from multiple individuals who have diverse viewpoints that may conflict with each other. Our work \textit{initiates} the theoretical study of multi-party RLHF that explicitly models the diverse preferences of multiple individuals. We show how traditional RLHF approaches can fail since learning a single reward function cannot capture and balance the preferences of multiple individuals. To overcome such limitations, we incorporate meta-learning to learn multiple preferences and adopt different social welfare functions to aggregate the preferences across multiple parties. We focus on the offline learning setting and establish sample complexity bounds, along with efficiency and fairness guarantees, for optimizing diverse social welfare functions such as Nash, Utilitarian, and Leximin welfare functions. Our results show a separation between the sample complexities of multi-party RLHF and traditional single-party RLHF. Furthermore, we consider a reward-free setting, where each individual's preference is no longer consistent with a reward model, and give pessimistic variants of the von Neumann Winner based on offline preference data. Taken together, our work showcases the advantage of multi-party RLHF but also highlights its more demanding statistical complexity.

Provable Multi-Party Reinforcement Learning with Diverse Human Feedback

TL;DR

This work initiates the theoretical study of multi-party RLHF that explicitly models the diverse preferences of multiple individuals and establishes sample complexity bounds, along with efficiency and fairness guarantees, for optimizing diverse social welfare functions such as Nash, Utilitarian, and Leximin welfare functions.

Abstract

Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) is an emerging paradigm to align models with human preferences. Typically, RLHF aggregates preferences from multiple individuals who have diverse viewpoints that may conflict with each other. Our work \textit{initiates} the theoretical study of multi-party RLHF that explicitly models the diverse preferences of multiple individuals. We show how traditional RLHF approaches can fail since learning a single reward function cannot capture and balance the preferences of multiple individuals. To overcome such limitations, we incorporate meta-learning to learn multiple preferences and adopt different social welfare functions to aggregate the preferences across multiple parties. We focus on the offline learning setting and establish sample complexity bounds, along with efficiency and fairness guarantees, for optimizing diverse social welfare functions such as Nash, Utilitarian, and Leximin welfare functions. Our results show a separation between the sample complexities of multi-party RLHF and traditional single-party RLHF. Furthermore, we consider a reward-free setting, where each individual's preference is no longer consistent with a reward model, and give pessimistic variants of the von Neumann Winner based on offline preference data. Taken together, our work showcases the advantage of multi-party RLHF but also highlights its more demanding statistical complexity.
Paper Structure (27 sections, 23 theorems, 132 equations, 2 algorithms)

This paper contains 27 sections, 23 theorems, 132 equations, 2 algorithms.

Key Result

Theorem 1

Suppose Assumptions as:linear-as:well hold. If the number of samples satisfies $n\gg d+\log(M/\delta)$ for $\delta\in (0,1)$, then with probability at least $1-\delta$, for any $m\in [M]$,

Theorems & Definitions (48)

  • Theorem 1
  • Remark 1
  • Theorem 2
  • Theorem 3: Lower Bound
  • Definition 1: $\tau$-approximate Pareto Efficiency
  • Theorem 4
  • Theorem 5
  • Theorem 6
  • Theorem 7
  • Theorem 8
  • ...and 38 more