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Consciousness qua Mortal Computation

Johannes Kleiner

TL;DR

This work shows that consciousness cannot be a Turing computation, and implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.

Abstract

Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.

Consciousness qua Mortal Computation

TL;DR

This work shows that consciousness cannot be a Turing computation, and implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.

Abstract

Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.
Paper Structure (7 sections, 3 theorems, 6 equations)

This paper contains 7 sections, 3 theorems, 6 equations.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Mortal Computation
  3. Computational Functionalism
  4. Programs
  5. Turing Computation
  6. Immortal Computation
  7. Conclusion

Key Result

Lemma 1

$c^\ast \not\in \mathcal{P}\!\,r\!\,o\!\,g$.

Theorems & Definitions (7)

  • Definition 1
  • Lemma 1
  • proof
  • Lemma 2
  • proof
  • Lemma 3
  • proof