Comparing Inferential Strategies of Humans and Large Language Models in Deductive Reasoning
Philipp Mondorf, Barbara Plank
TL;DR
The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) employ inferential strategies in propositional logic that resemble human reasoning. Using a cross-model evaluation across Zephyr-7B-$\beta$, Mistral-7B-Instruct, and LLaMA-2 variants with zero-shot chain-of-thought prompts, the authors analyze both the strategies used and the logical soundness of the reasoning through manual annotation. They find that LLMs adopt human-like strategies such as supposition following and chain construction, with model-family-dependent preferences and only a moderate link between final correctness and reasoning quality. The work highlights that final answer accuracy alone is insufficient to judge reasoning capabilities and calls for more nuanced evaluation frameworks and faithfulness checks, while outlining directions for larger datasets and automatic strategy classification to advance understanding of LLM reasoning.
Abstract
Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like $\textit{supposition following}$ or $\textit{chain construction}$. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.
