Reframing the Expected Free Energy: Four Formulations and a Unification
Théophile Champion, Howard Bowman, Dimitrije Marković, Marek Grześ
TL;DR
The paper formalizes the unification problem for the four active-inference expected free energy formulations by introducing a forecast distribution $F$ and a target distribution $T$ and defining a root $\mathcal{G}_{rt}$. It shows that if the root is taken as the risk over observations plus ambiguity ($C_{ROA}$), all four formulations $C_{RSA}$, $C_{ROA}$, $C_{IGPV}$, and $C_{3E}$ can be recovered, but this imposes constraints on prior preferences over observations that may be incompatible with the likelihood mapping, i.e., $T(o|s)$ and $A$. Alternatively, using a justified root $C_{RSA}$ yields a rigorous justification but only recovers two formulations, with ROA and IGPV as lower-bound constructions. The work clarifies theoretical foundations, demonstrates the compatibility tensions between priors and likelihoods, and outlines avenues for deriving a principled, computable EFE suitable for deep active inference. It highlights the need for alternative factorizations or principled priors to achieve full unification and practical applicability in decision-making under uncertainty.
Abstract
Active inference is a leading theory of perception, learning and decision making, which can be applied to neuroscience, robotics, psychology, and machine learning. Active inference is based on the expected free energy, which is mostly justified by the intuitive plausibility of its formulations, e.g., the risk plus ambiguity and information gain / pragmatic value formulations. This paper seek to formalize the problem of deriving these formulations from a single root expected free energy definition, i.e., the unification problem. Then, we study two settings, each one having its own root expected free energy definition. In the first setting, no justification for the expected free energy has been proposed to date, but all the formulations can be recovered from it. However, in this setting, the agent cannot have arbitrary prior preferences over observations. Indeed, only a limited class of prior preferences over observations is compatible with the likelihood mapping of the generative model. In the second setting, a justification of the root expected free energy definition is known, but this setting only accounts for two formulations, i.e., the risk over states plus ambiguity and entropy plus expected energy formulations.
