Causal Equal Protection as Algorithmic Fairness
Marcello Di Bello, Nicolò Cangiotti, Michele Loi
TL;DR
The paper tackles fairness in trial-based classifications by proposing causal equal protection, a criterion that combines classification parity with causal reasoning via do-calculus to require that protected traits not generate uneven misclassification risk in aggregate. It differentiates diagnostic and predictive evidence, analyzes direct and indirect causal influences, and uses stylized legal examples to show when parity alone is misleading and when causal mediation can justify or undermine evidence. The key contribution is a formal, process-level criterion, expressed as $P(C=1 \mid do[A=1] \& do[Y=0]) = P(C=1 \mid do[A=0] \& do[Y=0])$, that captures when risk imposition is fairly allocated across groups. This framework clarifies the fairness of legal evidence and informs broader judgments about algorithmic fairness in criminal justice and related domains, while acknowledging limitations and the need to model socially salient traits as causal structures rather than simple variables.
Abstract
By combining the philosophical literature on statistical evidence and the interdisciplinary literature on algorithmic fairness, we revisit recent objections against classification parity in light of causal analyses of algorithmic fairness and the distinction between predictive and diagnostic evidence. We focus on trial proceedings as a black-box classification algorithm in which defendants are sorted into two groups by convicting or acquitting them. We defend a novel principle, causal equal protection, that combines classification parity with the causal approach. In the do-calculus, causal equal protection requires that individuals should not be subject to uneven risks of classification error because of their protected or socially salient characteristics. The explicit use of protected characteristics, however, may be required if it equalizes these risks.
