The Computational Complexity of the Housing Market
Edwin Lock, Zephyr Qiu, Alexander Teytelboym
TL;DR
The paper establishes that finding approximate competitive equilibria in Gale's housing market with income effects is $PPAD$-complete, even for $n=3$ agents with identical preferences. It achieves this by proving a computational equivalence between HousingMarket and RainbowKKM, and by constructing polynomial-time reductions from CakeCutting and 2D-Sperner to RainbowKKM. The results hold in both white-box (polynomial-time preference descriptions) and black-box (query oracle) models, with exponential query bounds in the black-box setting for $n\ge 4$. This work situates equilibrium computation with income effects among $PPAD$-complete problems, highlighting fundamental barriers to efficient computation in realistic market designs and outlining several avenues for future research, including the role of utility representations and practical approximation methods.
Abstract
We prove that the classic problem of finding a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible goods, money, and unit-demand agents is PPAD-complete. In this "housing market", agents have preferences over the house and amount of money they end up with, but can experience income effects. Our results contrast with the existence of polynomial-time algorithms for related problems: Top Trading Cycles for the "housing exchange" problem in which there are no transfers and the Hungarian algorithm for the "housing assignment" problem in which agents' utilities are linear in money. Along the way, we prove that the Rainbow-KKM problem, a total search problem based on a generalization by Gale of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma, is PPAD-complete. Our reductions also imply bounds on the query complexity of finding competitive equilibrium.
