Coding-Based Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptosystem for Non-Uniform Information
Saar Tarnopolsky, Alejandro Cohen
TL;DR
The paper addresses secure communication of non-uniform messages over a multi-link network in a post-quantum setting, introducing NU-HUNCC, a hybrid scheme that combines polar-based almost-uniform source coding with a sub-linear seed, an information-theoretic secure channel code, and selective post-quantum encryption. It provides a rigorous information-theoretic security guarantee against IT-Eve via $k_s$-IS, and a cryptographic security guarantee against Crypto-Eve via ISS-CCA1, achieving high data rates close to network capacity. A key practical insight is that the seed length $d_J$ can be kept sub-linear with $d_J \in [n^{0.7214}, n^{0.7331}]$, enabling efficient pre-processing and scalable security for non-uniform sources. The results offer a viable path toward PQ-secure, high-rate transmission in distributed settings and secure storage applications, balancing information-theoretic and computational security requirements.
Abstract
We introduce for non-uniform messages a novel hybrid universal network coding cryptosystem (NU-HUNCC) in the finite blocklength regime that provides Post-Quantum (PQ) security at high communication rates. Recently, hybrid cryptosystems offered PQ security by premixing the data using secure coding schemes and encrypting only a small portion of it, assuming the data is uniformly distributed. An assumption that is often challenging to enforce. Standard fixed-length lossless source coding and compression schemes guarantee a uniform output in normalized divergence. Yet, his is not sufficient to guarantee security. We consider an efficient almost uniform compression scheme in non-normalized variational distance for the proposed hybrid cryptosystem, that by utilizing uniform sub-linear shared seed, guarantees PQ security. Specifically, for the proposed PQ cryptosystem, first, we provide an end-to-end coding scheme, NU-HUNCC, for non-uniform messages. Second, we show that NU-HUNCC is information-theoretic individually secured (IS) against an eavesdropper with access to any subset of the links. Third, we introduce a modified security definition, individually semantically secure under a chosen ciphertext attack (ISS-CCA1), and show that against an all-observing eavesdropper, NU-HUNCC satisfies its conditions. Finally, we provide an analysis that shows the high communication rate of NU-HUNCC and the negligibility of the shared seed size.
