A Deep Learning Method for Optimal Investment Under Relative Performance Criteria Among Heterogeneous Agents
Mathieu Laurière, Ludovic Tangpi, Xuchen Zhou
TL;DR
This paper develops a deep learning framework to compute Nash equilibria for optimal investment in stochastic graphon games with relative performance criteria. By leveraging forward-backward stochastic differential equations (graphon MKV FBSDEs) and a shooting-based neural network approach, the authors solve continuous-space graphon games and examine how different interaction graphs G shape optimal strategies, wealth dynamics, and utilities. They validate the method with a Black-Scholes baseline and extend to Markovian coefficients, analyzing the impact of graphon structure and risk aversion on outcomes, while providing convergence metrics via exploitability. The work advances scalable, data-driven simulation of heterogeneous, networked agents in finance, enabling nuanced assessment of competitive environments and interaction patterns in large populations.
Abstract
Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.
