What can Information Guess? Guessing Advantage vs. Rényi Entropy for Small Leakages
Julien Béguinot, Olivier Rioul
TL;DR
This work addresses bounding an adversary's guessing advantage under small information leakage by exploiting the Gibbs inequality and its Rényi generalization to obtain closed-form parametric lower bounds for the $\rho$-th order guessing entropy $G_\rho(X|Y)$ in terms of the Rényi-Arimoto entropy $H_\alpha(X|Y)$. The authors derive explicit parametric curves for the unconditional and conditional cases, including a first-order bound $\Delta G_\rho(X;Y) \lesssim c\sqrt{\Delta H_\alpha(X;Y)}$ in the small-leakage regime, and validate the results in Hamming weight leakage and random probing models. The bounds show substantial improvements over prior non-asymptotic and asymptotic results, enabling tighter practical assessment of leakage resilience and aiding countermeasure design. The framework also points to extensions to additive-noise leakage models, nonuniform priors, and negative $\alpha$ values for broader applicability.
Abstract
We leverage the Gibbs inequality and its natural generalization to Rényi entropies to derive closed-form parametric expressions of the optimal lower bounds of $ρ$th-order guessing entropy (guessing moment) of a secret taking values on a finite set, in terms of the Rényi-Arimoto $α$-entropy. This is carried out in an non-asymptotic regime when side information may be available. The resulting bounds yield a theoretical solution to a fundamental problem in side-channel analysis: Ensure that an adversary will not gain much guessing advantage when the leakage information is sufficiently weakened by proper countermeasures in a given cryptographic implementation. Practical evaluation for classical leakage models show that the proposed bounds greatly improve previous ones for analyzing the capability of an adversary to perform side-channel attacks.
