CARE: Ensemble Adversarial Robustness Evaluation Against Adaptive Attackers for Security Applications
Hangsheng Zhang, Jiqiang Liu, Jinsong Dong
TL;DR
CARE introduces a comprehensive cybersecurity adversarial robustness evaluation framework that benchmarks ensemble defenses against adaptive attackers. The approach couples an attack library with a diverse model library and utility evaluations, enabling adaptive ensemble attacks (EMA/TEA) and robust automatic defenses (MA-AT/TE-AT) optimized via Bayesian methods to maximize defense performance under multiple attack types. The key contribution is Robus t Ensemble Adversarial Training (R-AT), which uses a Bayesian-optimized objective to select ensemble weights that resist multiple attacks and adaptive strategies, demonstrated across five security datasets and a range of detectors. The findings show that general ensembles alone cannot guarantee robustness, adaptive ensemble attacks can defeat simple defenses, and the proposed R-AT significantly improves defense resilience, enabling practical, scalable evaluation relevant to real-world security systems.
Abstract
Ensemble defenses, are widely employed in various security-related applications to enhance model performance and robustness. The widespread adoption of these techniques also raises many questions: Are general ensembles defenses guaranteed to be more robust than individuals? Will stronger adaptive attacks defeat existing ensemble defense strategies as the cybersecurity arms race progresses? Can ensemble defenses achieve adversarial robustness to different types of attacks simultaneously and resist the continually adjusted adaptive attacks? Unfortunately, these critical questions remain unresolved as there are no platforms for comprehensive evaluation of ensemble adversarial attacks and defenses in the cybersecurity domain. In this paper, we propose a general Cybersecurity Adversarial Robustness Evaluation (CARE) platform aiming to bridge this gap.
