Cross-Modality Perturbation Synergy Attack for Person Re-identification
Yunpeng Gong, Zhun Zhong, Yansong Qu, Zhiming Luo, Rongrong Ji, Min Jiang
TL;DR
This work introduces the Cross-Modality Perturbation Synergy (CMPS) attack to expose security vulnerabilities in cross-modality ReID systems, uniting gradients from RGB, grayscale, and infrared modalities to craft a universal perturbation $\eta$. A cross-modality attack augmentation using grayscale transforms bridges modality gaps, while a cross-modality triplet loss coordinates cross-domain feature relationships. The authors demonstrate dramatic reductions in Rank-1 accuracy across SYSU, RegDB, and LLCM benchmarks and show strong transferability across models, outperforming state-of-the-art cross-modality attacks. The work also provides theoretical support for aggregated optimization over separate modality updates, suggesting lower generalization error and superior perturbation universality. This study highlights the need for robust defenses in multi-sensor ReID systems and points to future defense-focused research to counter cross-modality adversarial threats.
Abstract
In recent years, there has been significant research focusing on addressing security concerns in single-modal person re-identification (ReID) systems that are based on RGB images. However, the safety of cross-modality scenarios, which are more commonly encountered in practical applications involving images captured by infrared cameras, has not received adequate attention. The main challenge in cross-modality ReID lies in effectively dealing with visual differences between different modalities. For instance, infrared images are typically grayscale, unlike visible images that contain color information. Existing attack methods have primarily focused on the characteristics of the visible image modality, overlooking the features of other modalities and the variations in data distribution among different modalities. This oversight can potentially undermine the effectiveness of these methods in image retrieval across diverse modalities. This study represents the first exploration into the security of cross-modality ReID models and proposes a universal perturbation attack specifically designed for cross-modality ReID. This attack optimizes perturbations by leveraging gradients from diverse modality data, thereby disrupting the discriminator and reinforcing the differences between modalities. We conducted experiments on three widely used cross-modality datasets, namely RegDB, SYSU, and LLCM. The results not only demonstrate the effectiveness of our method but also provide insights for future improvements in the robustness of cross-modality ReID systems. The code will be available at https://github.com/finger-monkey/cmps__attack.
