The Fairness of Redistricting Ghost
Jia-Wei Liang, Nina Amenta
TL;DR
This paper analyzes Redistricting Ghost, an abstract redistricting protocol where two parties alternately assign voters to districts without an independent arbiter. In a nongeometric setting, the minority can guarantee at least $p-1$ districts, where $p = \text{round}(j n / v)$, while the majority can employ a cracking strategy to cap the minority at $p-1$ when the minority share is small; the authors provide precise bounds and strategies for both players. They show a concrete lower bound $n \ge 2q(m+1)$ guaranteeing $q$ districts for the minority, and a complementary lower bound $n < f(q)$ (with $f(q) = 2q \left( 1 - \frac{q}{j+q} \right)(m+1) - 1$) preventing such wins under a cracking majority. A key result is the existence of a gap between these bounds, indicating ranges where proportional fairness or gerrymandering-like outcomes are not fully characterized, with conjectures about the dependence on minority size and first-mover effects. The work motivates study of fairness under abstract protocols and highlights the need to extend analyses to geometric and graph-based models for more realistic redistricting scenarios.
Abstract
We explore the fairness of a redistricting game introduced by Mixon and Villar, which provides a two-party protocol for dividing a state into electoral districts, without the participation of an independent authority. We analyze the game in an abstract setting that ignores the geographic distribution of voters and assumes that voter preferences are fixed and known. We show that the minority player can always win at least $p-1$ districts, where $p$ is proportional to the percentage of minority voters. We give an upper bound on the number of districts won by the minority based on a "cracking" strategy for the majority.
