Privacy Analysis of Affine Transformations in Cloud-based MPC: Vulnerability to Side-knowledge
Teimour Hosseinalizadeh, Nils Schlüter, Moritz Schulze Darup, Nima Monshizadeh
TL;DR
This work analyzes the privacy of cloud-based model predictive control when initiated via random affine transformations. It shows that, under mild side-knowledge about the control problem, both separate-form and dense-form MPC transformations leak privacy: the cloud can recover the system dynamics up to a similarity transform and infer cost-parameter structure, with exact recovery possible in several common knowledge scenarios. The authors provide rigorous proofs of identifiability and illustrate the findings with numerical experiments on a quadruple-tank process, highlighting practical privacy breaches as horizon length increases. The results underscore that simple affine-based privacy is not robust to side-knowledge and motivate developing stronger privacy-preserving mechanisms for real-time cloud-assisted MPC, including time-varying transformations and additional obfuscation strategies.
Abstract
Search for the optimizer in computationally demanding model predictive control (MPC) setups can be facilitated by Cloud as a service provider in cyber-physical systems. This advantage introduces the risk that Cloud can obtain unauthorized access to the privacy-sensitive parameters of the system and cost function. To solve this issue, i.e., preventing Cloud from accessing the parameters while benefiting from Cloud computation, random affine transformations provide an exact yet light weight in computation solution. This research deals with analyzing privacy preserving properties of these transformations when they are adopted for MPC problems. We consider two common strategies for outsourcing the optimization required in MPC problems, namely separate and dense forms, and establish that random affine transformations utilized in these forms are vulnerable to side-knowledge from Cloud. Specifically, we prove that the privacy guarantees of these methods and their extensions for separate form are undermined when a mild side-knowledge about the problem in terms of structure of MPC cost function is available. In addition, while we prove that outsourcing the MPC problem in the dense form inherently leads to some degree of privacy for the system and cost function parameters, we also establish that affine transformations applied to this form are nevertheless prone to be undermined by a Cloud with mild side-knowledge. Numerical simulations confirm our results.
