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Auxiliary Network-Enabled Attack Detection and Resilient Control of Islanded AC Microgrid

Vaibhav Vaishnav, Anoop Jain, Dushyant Sharma

TL;DR

The paper tackles the problem of cyber-resilience in islanded AC microgrids under stealthy false data injection attacks that affect both frequency and power information. It introduces an auxiliary (virtual) layer Π that cooperates with the actual control layer Σ to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing, while enabling a network-enabled attack-detection mechanism via cross-layer interactions. The main results include stability proofs for the closed-loop system, explicit bounds on frequency and power deviations under bounded attacks (εω and εP) that depend on β, the Laplacian L, and pinning G, and an attack-detection test that can identify compromised links and support isolation if the network remains connected. Simulation in Simulink demonstrates the framework's ability to maintain near-nominal frequency and power sharing under attack and perturbations, and validates the proposed attack-detection mechanism. Overall, the work provides a practically implementable, provably stable cyber-resilient architecture for islanded microgrids with a dedicated detection pathway and performance guarantees under bounded stealthy attacks.

Abstract

This paper proposes a cyber-resilient distributed control strategy equipped with attack detection capabilities for islanded AC microgrids in the presence of bounded stealthy cyber attacks affecting both frequency and power information exchanged among neighboring distributed generators (DGs). The proposed control methodology relies on the construction of an auxiliary layer and the establishment of effective inter-layer cooperation between the actual DGs in the control layer and the virtual DGs in the auxiliary layer. This cooperation aims to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing. It is shown that the in situ presence of a concealed auxiliary layer not only guarantees resilience against stealthy bounded attacks on both frequency and power-sharing but also facilitates a network-enabled attack identification mechanism. The paper provides rigorous proof of the stability of the closed-loop system and derives bounds for frequency and power deviations under attack conditions, offering insights into the impact of the attack signal, control and pinning gains, and network connectivity on the system's convergence properties. The performance of the proposed controllers is illustrated by simulating a networked islanded AC microgrid in a Simulink environment showcasing both attributes of attack resilience and attack detection.

Auxiliary Network-Enabled Attack Detection and Resilient Control of Islanded AC Microgrid

TL;DR

The paper tackles the problem of cyber-resilience in islanded AC microgrids under stealthy false data injection attacks that affect both frequency and power information. It introduces an auxiliary (virtual) layer Π that cooperates with the actual control layer Σ to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing, while enabling a network-enabled attack-detection mechanism via cross-layer interactions. The main results include stability proofs for the closed-loop system, explicit bounds on frequency and power deviations under bounded attacks (εω and εP) that depend on β, the Laplacian L, and pinning G, and an attack-detection test that can identify compromised links and support isolation if the network remains connected. Simulation in Simulink demonstrates the framework's ability to maintain near-nominal frequency and power sharing under attack and perturbations, and validates the proposed attack-detection mechanism. Overall, the work provides a practically implementable, provably stable cyber-resilient architecture for islanded microgrids with a dedicated detection pathway and performance guarantees under bounded stealthy attacks.

Abstract

This paper proposes a cyber-resilient distributed control strategy equipped with attack detection capabilities for islanded AC microgrids in the presence of bounded stealthy cyber attacks affecting both frequency and power information exchanged among neighboring distributed generators (DGs). The proposed control methodology relies on the construction of an auxiliary layer and the establishment of effective inter-layer cooperation between the actual DGs in the control layer and the virtual DGs in the auxiliary layer. This cooperation aims to achieve robust frequency restoration and proportional active power-sharing. It is shown that the in situ presence of a concealed auxiliary layer not only guarantees resilience against stealthy bounded attacks on both frequency and power-sharing but also facilitates a network-enabled attack identification mechanism. The paper provides rigorous proof of the stability of the closed-loop system and derives bounds for frequency and power deviations under attack conditions, offering insights into the impact of the attack signal, control and pinning gains, and network connectivity on the system's convergence properties. The performance of the proposed controllers is illustrated by simulating a networked islanded AC microgrid in a Simulink environment showcasing both attributes of attack resilience and attack detection.
Paper Structure (16 sections, 9 theorems, 42 equations, 16 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 16 sections, 9 theorems, 42 equations, 16 figures, 1 table.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Notations, Graph Theory, and Mathematical Preliminaries
  3. Distributed Secondary Droop Control
  4. System Description and Problem Statement
  5. System Description
  6. Problem Statement
  7. Distributed Attack Resilient Frequency control
  8. Distributed Attack Resilient Power Control
  9. Attack Detection: Exploring Interaction Between Control and Auxiliary Layers
  10. Simulation Case Studies
  11. Controller performance under attacked condition
  12. Absence of auxiliary layer
  13. Presence of auxiliary layer
  14. Effect of load perturbations
  15. Attack Detection
  16. ...and 1 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 1

Let $\mathcal{G}$ be an undirected and connected graph with Laplacian $L \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, and $B = {\rm diag}\{b_1, \ldots, b_n\} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries $b_i > 0, \forall i$. Then, the matrix $L + B$ is positive-definite.

Figures (16)

  • Figure 1: Microgrid network and control architecture.
  • Figure 2: Information flow due to interaction network ($\beta A$) between control ($\Sigma$) and auxiliary ($\Pi$) layers.
  • Figure 3: The test islanded AC microgrid under consideration.
  • Figure 4: DG frequency under attack and absence of $\Pi$ layer.
  • Figure 5: DG active power under attack and absence of $\Pi$ layer.
  • ...and 11 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (18)

  • Lemma 1: wang2010, vaishnav2023
  • Lemma 2: dong2020resilient
  • Lemma 3
  • proof
  • Lemma 4
  • proof
  • Lemma 5: Frequency control in absence of attack
  • proof
  • Theorem 1: Frequency control in presence of attack
  • Lemma 6
  • ...and 8 more