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A Novel RFID Authentication Protocol Based on A Block-Order-Modulus Variable Matrix Encryption Algorithm

Yan Wang, Ruiqi Liu, Tong Gao, Feng Shu, Xuemei Lei, Yongpeng Wu, Guan Gui, Jiangzhou Wang

TL;DR

A two-way RFID authentication protocol, named AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID, is proposed specifically for mobile RFID systems and achieves both low computational complexity and low storage overhead, making it well-suited for deployment in resource-constrained, low-cost RFID tags.

Abstract

In this paper, authentication for mobile radio frequency identification (RFID) systems with low-cost RFID sensor tags is studied. Firstly, an adaptive modulus (AM) encryption algorithm is proposed. Subsequently, in order to enhance the security without additional storage of new key matrices, a self-updating encryption order (SUEO) algorithm is designed. Furthermore, a diagonal block local transpose key matrix (DBLTKM) encryption algorithm is presented, which effectively expands the feasible domain of the key space. Based on the above three algorithms, a novel joint AM-SUEO-DBLTKM encryption algorithm is constructed. Making full use of the advantages of the proposed joint algorithm, a two-way RFID authentication protocol, named AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID, is proposed for mobile RFID systems. In addition, the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and security analysis indicate that the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID protocol can effectively combat various typical attacks. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM algorithm can save 99.59% of tag storage over traditional algorithms. Finally, the low computational complexity as well as the low storage cost of the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID protocol facilitates deployment within low-cost RFID sensor tags.

A Novel RFID Authentication Protocol Based on A Block-Order-Modulus Variable Matrix Encryption Algorithm

TL;DR

A two-way RFID authentication protocol, named AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID, is proposed specifically for mobile RFID systems and achieves both low computational complexity and low storage overhead, making it well-suited for deployment in resource-constrained, low-cost RFID tags.

Abstract

In this paper, authentication for mobile radio frequency identification (RFID) systems with low-cost RFID sensor tags is studied. Firstly, an adaptive modulus (AM) encryption algorithm is proposed. Subsequently, in order to enhance the security without additional storage of new key matrices, a self-updating encryption order (SUEO) algorithm is designed. Furthermore, a diagonal block local transpose key matrix (DBLTKM) encryption algorithm is presented, which effectively expands the feasible domain of the key space. Based on the above three algorithms, a novel joint AM-SUEO-DBLTKM encryption algorithm is constructed. Making full use of the advantages of the proposed joint algorithm, a two-way RFID authentication protocol, named AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID, is proposed for mobile RFID systems. In addition, the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and security analysis indicate that the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID protocol can effectively combat various typical attacks. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM algorithm can save 99.59% of tag storage over traditional algorithms. Finally, the low computational complexity as well as the low storage cost of the proposed AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID protocol facilitates deployment within low-cost RFID sensor tags.
Paper Structure (18 sections, 46 equations, 10 figures, 9 tables, 4 algorithms)

This paper contains 18 sections, 46 equations, 10 figures, 9 tables, 4 algorithms.

Figures (10)

  • Figure 1: Comparison between a traditional RFID system and a mobile RFID system.
  • Figure 2: Different encryption algorithms are proposed from different perspectives and further joint encryption algorithms are presented.
  • Figure 3: Comparison between the traditional key matrix encryption algorithm and the proposed joint AM-SUEO-DBLTKM encryption algorithm.
  • Figure 4: Proposed two-way AM-SUEO-DBLTKM-RFID authentication protocol.
  • Figure 5: Attackers cannot infer $p$ through $q$.
  • ...and 5 more figures