Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups

Daji Landis

Abstract

Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that shows that the incentives are not aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model.

Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups

Abstract

Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that shows that the incentives are not aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model.
Paper Structure (11 sections, 9 theorems, 37 equations, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 11 sections, 9 theorems, 37 equations, 1 algorithm.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. Our Model
  4. Search costs
  5. Main Result
  6. Potential Solutions
  7. Random Checks
  8. Random Mistakes
  9. Easter Eggs
  10. The Role of the Transactor
  11. Remark

Key Result

lemma thmcounterlemma

The optimistic rollup paradigm as described in Algorithm 1 yields ($A$ behaving honestly) and ($V$ posing no challenge) as the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when $V$ has perfect information and all players are rational and risk neutral.

Theorems & Definitions (16)

  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • proof
  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • proof
  • theorem thmcountertheorem
  • proof
  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • lemma thmcounterlemma
  • proof
  • ...and 6 more