The Impact of Load Altering Attacks on Distribution Systems with ZIP Loads
Sajjad Maleki, Shijie Pan, E. Veronica Belmega, Charalambos Konstantinou, Subhash Lakshminarayana
TL;DR
Addresses LAAs in IoT controllable loads affecting distribution system voltages with ZIP loads. It develops a tractable analytical framework by combining LinDistFlow with ZP ZIP approximation to derive closed-form expressions for voltages in terms of $U_k = V_k^2$ after an LAA. Contributions include ZIP aware voltage analysis, a method to compute the minimum number of devices for voltage safety violations, and an evaluation of attack location effects, validated on the IEEE-33 bus with a maximum error around 1.07 percent. The results show ZIP loads reduce worst-case voltage drops relative to constant-power loads and highlight leaf-bus attacks as particularly critical, offering fast risk assessment for defense planning in IoT-enabled distribution networks.
Abstract
Load-altering attacks (LAAs) pose a significant threat to power systems with Internet of Things (IoT)-controllable load devices. This research examines the detrimental impact of LAAs on the voltage profile of distribution systems, taking into account the realistic load model with constant impedance Z, constant current I, and constant power P (ZIP). We derive closed-form expressions for computing the voltages of buses following LAA by making approximations to the power flow as well as the load model. We also characterize the minimum number of devices to be manipulated in order to cause voltage safety violations in the system. We conduct extensive simulations using the IEEE-33 bus system to verify the accuracy of the proposed approximations and highlight the difference between the attack impacts while considering constant power and the ZIP load model (which is more representative of real-world loads).
