Stochastic Control with Distributionally Robust Constraints for Cyber-Physical Systems Vulnerable to Attacks
Nishanth Venkatesh, Aditya Dave, Ioannis Faros, Andreas A. Malikopoulos
TL;DR
The paper tackles robust performance of cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks by formulating a finite-horizon stochastic control problem with a distributionally robust constraint on the attack-induced penalty. It introduces a dynamic programming decomposition that uses penalty-to-go functions and bound functions to guarantee recursive feasibility of the constraint, and provides a DP recurrence for the expanded state $(X_t,L_t)$. A theoretical result ensures the computed policy is optimal and implementable via $u_t^*=g_t^*(x_t,l_t)$ with an optimal bound $\lambda_{t+1}^*$. A numerical reach-avoid example on a grid demonstrates how the distributionally robust approach trades conservativeness for performance, offering a practical method for resilience in CPS under attack.
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the control of a cyber-physical system (CPS) while accounting for its vulnerability to external attacks. We formulate a constrained stochastic problem with a robust constraint to ensure robust operation against potential attacks. We seek to minimize the expected cost subject to a constraint limiting the worst-case expected damage an attacker can impose on the CPS. We present a dynamic programming decomposition to compute the optimal control strategy in this robust-constrained formulation and prove its recursive feasibility. We also illustrate the utility of our results by applying them to a numerical simulation.
