Hacking Cryptographic Protocols with Advanced Variational Quantum Attacks
Borja Aizpurua, Pablo Bermejo, Josu Etxezarreta Martinez, Roman Orus
TL;DR
This paper advances cryptanalytic capability on Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices by developing an improved Variational Quantum Attack Algorithm (VQAA) that uses fewer qubits and shallower circuits through non-orthogonal encoding and classical pre/post-processing. It demonstrates that, for symmetric ciphers such as S-DES, S-AES, and Blowfish, the attack achieves substantial reductions in iterations and runtime compared with brute-force, with 100% success in the tested cases, and shows scalability to broader cryptographic tasks including asymmetric protocols and hash functions. The key innovations include measuring the key register prior to encryption, representing multiple classical bits per qubit, a Hamming-distance cost, and a VQC ansatz with multiple layers plus coordinate transformations to mitigate barren plateaus. Collectively, these results indicate a meaningful step toward assessing the vulnerability of classical cryptographic protocols to quantum-powered attacks on NISQ hardware, while highlighting the ongoing need for quantum-safe standards as hardware scales. The work provides a foundation for future research in quantum cybersecurity, including the potential application to larger key sizes and real-device experiments.
Abstract
Here we introduce an improved approach to Variational Quantum Attack Algorithms (VQAA) on crytographic protocols. Our methods provide robust quantum attacks to well-known cryptographic algorithms, more efficiently and with remarkably fewer qubits than previous approaches. We implement simulations of our attacks for symmetric-key protocols such as S-DES, S-AES and Blowfish. For instance, we show how our attack allows a classical simulation of a small 8-qubit quantum computer to find the secret key of one 32-bit Blowfish instance with 24 times fewer number of iterations than a brute-force attack. Our work also shows improvements in attack success rates for lightweight ciphers such as S-DES and S-AES. Further applications beyond symmetric-key cryptography are also discussed, including asymmetric-key protocols and hash functions. In addition, we also comment on potential future improvements of our methods. Our results bring one step closer assessing the vulnerability of large-size classical cryptographic protocols with Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices, and set the stage for future research in quantum cybersecurity.
