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Couples can be tractable: New algorithms and hardness results for the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples

Gergely Csáji, David Manlove, Iain McBride, James Trimble

TL;DR

A novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching in an HRC instance where the couples' preferences are sub-responsive and sub-complete and it is shown that HRC with sub-responsive and sub-complete couples is NP-hard, even with other strong restrictions.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching (adjusting the hospitals' capacities by at most 1) in an HRC instance where the couples' preferences are sub-responsive (i.e., if one member switches to a better hospital, then the couple also improves) and sub-complete (i.e., each pair of hospitals that are individually acceptable to both members are jointly acceptable for the couple) by reducing it to an instance of the Stable Fixtures problem. We also present a polynomial-time algorithm for HRC in a sub-responsive, sub-complete instance that is a Dual Market, or where all couples are one of several possible types. We show that our algorithm also implies the polynomial-time solvability of a stable b-matching problem, where the underlying graph is a multigraph with loops. We complement our algorithms with several hardness results. We show that HRC with sub-responsive and sub-complete couples is NP-hard, even with other strong restrictions. We also show that HRC with a Dual Market is NP-hard under several simultaneous restrictions. Finally, we show that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in HRC is not approximable within $m^{1-\varepsilon}$, for any $\varepsilon>0$, where $m$ is the total length of the hospitals' preference lists, unless P=NP, even if each couple applies to only one pair of hospitals. Our polynomial-time solvability results greatly expand the class of known tractable instances of HRC and provide a useful tool for designing better and more efficient mechanisms in the future.

Couples can be tractable: New algorithms and hardness results for the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples

TL;DR

A novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching in an HRC instance where the couples' preferences are sub-responsive and sub-complete and it is shown that HRC with sub-responsive and sub-complete couples is NP-hard, even with other strong restrictions.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching (adjusting the hospitals' capacities by at most 1) in an HRC instance where the couples' preferences are sub-responsive (i.e., if one member switches to a better hospital, then the couple also improves) and sub-complete (i.e., each pair of hospitals that are individually acceptable to both members are jointly acceptable for the couple) by reducing it to an instance of the Stable Fixtures problem. We also present a polynomial-time algorithm for HRC in a sub-responsive, sub-complete instance that is a Dual Market, or where all couples are one of several possible types. We show that our algorithm also implies the polynomial-time solvability of a stable b-matching problem, where the underlying graph is a multigraph with loops. We complement our algorithms with several hardness results. We show that HRC with sub-responsive and sub-complete couples is NP-hard, even with other strong restrictions. We also show that HRC with a Dual Market is NP-hard under several simultaneous restrictions. Finally, we show that the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in HRC is not approximable within , for any , where is the total length of the hospitals' preference lists, unless P=NP, even if each couple applies to only one pair of hospitals. Our polynomial-time solvability results greatly expand the class of known tractable instances of HRC and provide a useful tool for designing better and more efficient mechanisms in the future.
Paper Structure (16 sections, 13 theorems, 14 equations, 13 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 16 sections, 13 theorems, 14 equations, 13 figures, 1 table.

Key Result

Theorem 5

Given an hrc instance where each couple's preferences are sub-responsive and sub-complete, there is always a near-feasible capacity vector $\textbf{q}'$ where $|\textbf{q}'-\textbf{q}|_{\infty}\le 1$, such that there is a stable matching with respect to the modified capacities. Furthermore, these mo

Figures (13)

  • Figure 1: The gadget for a couple of type-a, with some possible stable matchings highlighted with different colours. Numbers indicate preferences.
  • Figure 2: The gadget for a couple of type-b, with some possible stable matchings highlighted with different colours. Here, "last" means the least-preferred partner, "last-1" the second-least, etc.
  • Figure 3: The gadget for a couple of type-c, with some possible stable matchings highlighted with different colours. Here, "last" means the least-preferred partner, "last-1" the second-least, etc.
  • Figure 4: Preference lists in the constructed instance of hrc with sub-responsive and sub-complete preferences.
  • Figure 5: Preference lists in the constructed instance $I$ of hrc-dual market.
  • ...and 8 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (46)

  • Definition 1: MM10
  • Definition 2
  • Definition 3
  • Definition 4
  • Theorem 5
  • proof
  • proof
  • Claim 7
  • Remark 8
  • Remark 9
  • ...and 36 more