Game of arrivals at a two queue network with heterogeneous customer routes
Agniv Bandyopadhyay, Sandeep Juneja
TL;DR
The paper studies a two-queue queuing network with two customer classes and class-specific routes, modeled as a fluid game where arrivals are strategic and costs are linear in waiting and departure times. It establishes a rigorous characterization of equilibrium arrival profiles (EAPs) under both heterogeneous and equal-cost preferences, showing unique EAPs for unequal preferences and convex sets of equilibria for equal preferences. By partitioning parameter space into multiple regimes, the authors uncover up to eight distinct EAP structures in HAS/HDS, including cases with disjoint, contiguous, or overlapping arrival intervals, and even multiple intervals for a single class. The work reveals rich structural properties of equilibria in simple networks and argues that equilibrium learning or learning-approximation will become increasingly challenging as networks grow. These insights provide a foundation for understanding strategic arrivals in more complex networks and offer avenues for further exploration of non-fluid extensions and learning dynamics.
Abstract
We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and service completion time. We restrict ourselves to a two class, two queue network: this simplification is well motivated as the diversity in solution structure as a function of problem parameters is substantial even in this simple setting (e.g., a specific routing structure involves eight different regimes), suggesting a combinatorial blow up as the number of queues, routes and customer classes increase. We identify the unique Nash equilibrium customer arrival profile when the customer linear cost preferences are different. This profile is a function of problem parameters including the size of each class, service rates at each queue, and customer cost preferences. When customer cost preferences match, under certain parametric settings, the equilibrium arrival profiles may not be unique and may lie in a convex set. We further make a surprising observation that in some parametric settings, customers in one class may arrive in disjoint intervals. Further, the two classes may arrive in contiguous intervals or in overlapping intervals, and at varying rates within an interval, depending upon the problem parameters.
