Blockchain-Envisioned UAV-Aided Disaster Relief Networks: Challenges and Solutions
Yuntao Wang, Qinnan Hu, Zhendong Li, Zhou Su, Ruidong Li, Xiang Zou, Jian Zhou
TL;DR
This paper addresses the challenge of delivering relief in disasters when infrastructures fail by proposing blockchain-envisioned UAV-aided disaster relief networks (UDRNs). It introduces three core solutions: collaborative smart contracts for relief management, dynamic smart contract vulnerability audits, and robust transaction forensics with on/off-chain cooperation, validated by a prototype. The implementation shows that the proposed approach reduces transaction latency and improves vulnerability detection compared with baselines, while supporting hundreds of nodes. The work also outlines open research issues, including the use of generative AI, semantic communications, and cross-chain mechanisms to advance secure, scalable disaster relief.
Abstract
Natural or man-made disasters pose significant challenges for delivering critical relief to affected populations due to disruptions in critical infrastructures and logistics networks. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-aided disaster relief networks (UDRNs) leverage UAVs to assist existing ground relief networks by swiftly assessing affected areas and timely delivering lifesaving supplies. To meet the growing demands for collaborative, trust-free, and transparent UDRN services, blockchain-based UDRNs emerge as a promising approach through immutable ledgers and distributed smart contracts. However, several efficiency and security challenges hinder the deployment of blockchain-based UDRNs, including the lack of cooperation between smart contracts, lack of dynamic audit for smart contract vulnerabilities, and low forensics robustness against transaction malleability attacks. Towards efficient and secure blockchain-based UDRNs, this paper presents potential solutions: (i) a series of collaborative smart contracts for coordinated relief management, (ii) a dynamic contract audit mechanism to prevent known/unknown contract vulnerabilities; and (iii) a robust transaction forensics strategy with on/off-chain cooperation to resist transaction malleability attacks. Our prototype implementation and experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach. Lastly, we outline key open research issues crucial to advancing this emerging field.
