Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock
TL;DR
This paper studies budget-constrained buyers in markets with multiple divisible goods under a price-only mechanism. It introduces constrained social welfare and shows that competitive equilibria maximize it, while budgets can prevent classical utilitarian efficiency. When buyers have linear valuations, the authors prove a revenue-welfare coincidence: the competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-maximising for a zero-cost seller, and these prices also maximize the quantity allocated to buyers. The results have practical implications for digital advertising platforms and financial asset markets, suggesting price-based mechanisms can align welfare objectives with seller revenue under budget constraints.
Abstract
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that, when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-optimal for a zero-cost seller.
