Learning Optimal Advantage from Preferences and Mistaking it for Reward
W. Bradley Knox, Stephane Hatgis-Kessell, Sigurdur Orn Adalgeirsson, Serena Booth, Anca Dragan, Peter Stone, Scott Niekum
TL;DR
This paper analyzes the consequences of assuming human preferences arise from partial returns when they are actually generated by regret. It shows that reward-learning pipelines effectively learn the optimal advantage function $A^*_r$ rather than a true reward $r$, and explores the implications for policy invariance, reward shaping, and data efficiency. The authors demonstrate that treating $A^*_r$ as a reward preserves optimal policies under certain conditions but introduces strong shaping and potential inefficiencies; they advocate Greedy maximization of $A^*_r$ as a simpler, more principled approach. The work reframes RLHF and fine-tuning of large language models under the regret preference model, highlighting both theoretical identifiability benefits and practical considerations for sample efficiency and termination bias. Overall, the paper clarifies why partial-return-based methods perform well in practice and argues for aligning reward-learning with regret-based preferences for better fidelity and efficiency in sequential tasks.
Abstract
We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, $\hat{A^*_r}$, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of $\hat{A^*_r}$ is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of $\hat{A^*_r}$. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.
