Network Preference Dynamics using Lattice Theory
Hans Riess, Gregory Henselman-Petrusek, Michael C. Munger, Robert Ghrist, Zachary I. Bell, Michael M. Zavlanos
TL;DR
The paper develops a lattice-theoretic framework for dynamic, decentralized updating of agent preferences on networks, using an information order and meet/join operations to model revision and aggregation. It introduces a general message-passing scheme where agents exchange preference-relations, aggregate neighbor information via lattice-polynomial operators, and update their own preferences with structure-preserving maps. Existence of equilibrium (stable) preference profiles is established via the Tarski fixed-point theorem, with the equilibria forming a complete lattice and supporting greatest/least fixed points; convergence results are provided for inflationary/deflationary update schemes on finite option sets. Numerical experiments on random graphs demonstrate convergence to stable profiles, reveal monotone non-decreasing disagreement (Dirichlet energy), and show clustering of disagreements according to agents’ stubbornness, highlighting the model's potential for guiding design in distributed decision-making systems.
Abstract
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information about other agents. Exploiting the ordered algebraic structure of preferences, we introduce a message-passing algorithm for heterogeneous agents distributed over a network to update their preferences based on aggregations of the preferences of their neighbors in a graph. We demonstrate the existence of equilibrium points of the resulting global dynamical system of local preference updates and provide a sufficient condition for trajectories to converge to equilibria: stable preferences. Finally, we present numerical simulations demonstrating our preliminary results.
