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Privacy Preserving Federated Learning with Convolutional Variational Bottlenecks

Daniel Scheliga, Patrick Mäder, Marco Seeland

TL;DR

An attack is formulated that disables the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE by purposefully omitting stochastic gradients during attack optimization, and a novel privacy module is proposed—the Convolutional Variational Bottleneck (CVB)—that can be placed early in a neural network without suffering from these drawbacks.

Abstract

Gradient inversion attacks are an ubiquitous threat in federated learning as they exploit gradient leakage to reconstruct supposedly private training data. Recent work has proposed to prevent gradient leakage without loss of model utility by incorporating a PRivacy EnhanCing mODulE (PRECODE) based on variational modeling. Without further analysis, it was shown that PRECODE successfully protects against gradient inversion attacks. In this paper, we make multiple contributions. First, we investigate the effect of PRECODE on gradient inversion attacks to reveal its underlying working principle. We show that variational modeling introduces stochasticity into the gradients of PRECODE and the subsequent layers in a neural network. The stochastic gradients of these layers prevent iterative gradient inversion attacks from converging. Second, we formulate an attack that disables the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE by purposefully omitting stochastic gradients during attack optimization. To preserve the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE, our analysis reveals that variational modeling must be placed early in the network. However, early placement of PRECODE is typically not feasible due to reduced model utility and the exploding number of additional model parameters. Therefore, as a third contribution, we propose a novel privacy module -- the Convolutional Variational Bottleneck (CVB) -- that can be placed early in a neural network without suffering from these drawbacks. We conduct an extensive empirical study on three seminal model architectures and six image classification datasets. We find that all architectures are susceptible to gradient leakage attacks, which can be prevented by our proposed CVB. Compared to PRECODE, we show that our novel privacy module requires fewer trainable parameters, and thus computational and communication costs, to effectively preserve privacy.

Privacy Preserving Federated Learning with Convolutional Variational Bottlenecks

TL;DR

An attack is formulated that disables the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE by purposefully omitting stochastic gradients during attack optimization, and a novel privacy module is proposed—the Convolutional Variational Bottleneck (CVB)—that can be placed early in a neural network without suffering from these drawbacks.

Abstract

Gradient inversion attacks are an ubiquitous threat in federated learning as they exploit gradient leakage to reconstruct supposedly private training data. Recent work has proposed to prevent gradient leakage without loss of model utility by incorporating a PRivacy EnhanCing mODulE (PRECODE) based on variational modeling. Without further analysis, it was shown that PRECODE successfully protects against gradient inversion attacks. In this paper, we make multiple contributions. First, we investigate the effect of PRECODE on gradient inversion attacks to reveal its underlying working principle. We show that variational modeling introduces stochasticity into the gradients of PRECODE and the subsequent layers in a neural network. The stochastic gradients of these layers prevent iterative gradient inversion attacks from converging. Second, we formulate an attack that disables the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE by purposefully omitting stochastic gradients during attack optimization. To preserve the privacy preserving effect of PRECODE, our analysis reveals that variational modeling must be placed early in the network. However, early placement of PRECODE is typically not feasible due to reduced model utility and the exploding number of additional model parameters. Therefore, as a third contribution, we propose a novel privacy module -- the Convolutional Variational Bottleneck (CVB) -- that can be placed early in a neural network without suffering from these drawbacks. We conduct an extensive empirical study on three seminal model architectures and six image classification datasets. We find that all architectures are susceptible to gradient leakage attacks, which can be prevented by our proposed CVB. Compared to PRECODE, we show that our novel privacy module requires fewer trainable parameters, and thus computational and communication costs, to effectively preserve privacy.
Paper Structure (27 sections, 5 equations, 12 figures, 12 tables)

This paper contains 27 sections, 5 equations, 12 figures, 12 tables.

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: Content summary of this paper. Neural networks are trained on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset in a federated scenario. As training gradients leak private training data, different defense mechanism can be used for protection. While state-of-the-art perturbation techniques such as Differential Privacy can prevent reconstruction, they reduce model utility. PRECODE can preserve privacy if placed early in a model, but at the cost of reduced model utility and increased computational and communication resources. We propose a novel Convolutional Variational Bottleneck (CVB) to preserve privacy with notably less costs and improved model utility.
  • Figure 2: (a) Investigated federated learning setting; (b) Threat model and attack process of gradient inversion attacks.
  • Figure 3: Realization of the PRECODE extension as variational bottleneck.
  • Figure 4: Architecture of the baseline CNN used in the experiments of this paper. $P$ indicates the position at which privacy modules can be placed.
  • Figure 5: Behaviour of dummy gradients during a GI attack for (a) a CNN and (b) a CNN that is protected by PRECODE. Two random gradient values $g'_1$ and $g'_2$ of dummy gradients $G'$ of the indicated layers are tracked over the course of the GI attack. Color represents the attack iteration.
  • ...and 7 more figures