Sherlock Holmes Doesn't Play Dice: The mathematics of uncertain reasoning when something may happen, that one is not even able to figure out
Guido Fioretti
TL;DR
The paper addresses the inadequacy of traditional Probability Theory to express radical uncertainty about events not yet imagined. It advances Evidence Theory (ET), augmented by the Transferable Belief Model (TBM), to represent unknown unknowns with $m(\emptyset)>0$ and to model suspension of judgement with $m(\Theta)\ge0$, while maintaining a flexible frame of discernment $\Theta$ and overlapping hypotheses $A_i$. It then clarifies the relationships between ET, Probability Theory, and Information Theory, showing how ET encompasses Bayes' rule in the singleton, zero-unknowns limit and how imprecise probabilities and sub-additivity extend its applicability. Finally, it surveys coherence-based decision frameworks (CSNs, ENs, VNs, OWNs) and argues that open-world networks provide a robust path for integrating novel evidence into decision making, with potential for human–machine collaboration in uncertain environments.
Abstract
While Evidence Theory (also known as Dempster-Shafer Theory, or Belief Functions Theory) is being increasingly used in data fusion, its potentialities in the Social and Life Sciences are often obscured by lack of awareness of its distinctive features. In particular, with this paper I stress that an extended version of Evidence Theory can express the uncertainty deriving from the fear that events may materialize, that one is not even able to figure out. By contrast, Probability Theory must limit itself to the possibilities that a decision-maker is currently envisaging. I compare this extended version of Evidence Theory to sophisticated extensions of Probability Theory, such as imprecise and sub-additive probabilities, as well as unconventional versions of Information Theory that are employed in data fusion and transmission of cultural information. A further extension to multi-agent interaction is outlined.
