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Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network

Weiyi Wang, Yutao Jiao, Jin Chen, Wenting Dai, Jiawen Kang, Yuhua Xu

TL;DR

The paper tackles incentive misalignment in wireless blockchains by introducing a dual auction that splits transaction fees into relay and validation rewards, with a relay stage guided by a no-regret learning rule and a validation stage governed by the VCG mechanism. It proves IC, IR, and CE, derives a welfare-gap bound, and shows the relay policy converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium under polynomial-time computation. Comprehensive simulations demonstrate reduced energy and bandwidth consumption while maintaining TPS and security, even under faults and adversarial conditions. The work provides a practical, Sybil-proof framework for scalable incentive alignment in complex wireless blockchain networks.

Abstract

In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained complex wireless network. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for relay and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation sub-auction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes choose transactions based rewards to forward. Besides, relay nodes adjust the relaying probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). We also derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and bandwidth resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network.

Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network

TL;DR

The paper tackles incentive misalignment in wireless blockchains by introducing a dual auction that splits transaction fees into relay and validation rewards, with a relay stage guided by a no-regret learning rule and a validation stage governed by the VCG mechanism. It proves IC, IR, and CE, derives a welfare-gap bound, and shows the relay policy converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium under polynomial-time computation. Comprehensive simulations demonstrate reduced energy and bandwidth consumption while maintaining TPS and security, even under faults and adversarial conditions. The work provides a practical, Sybil-proof framework for scalable incentive alignment in complex wireless blockchain networks.

Abstract

In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the energy-constrained complex wireless network. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for relay and validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction mechanism consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation sub-auction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes choose transactions based rewards to forward. Besides, relay nodes adjust the relaying probability through a no-regret algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes select transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block. We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility (IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE). We also derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and bandwidth resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network.
Paper Structure (22 sections, 6 theorems, 35 equations, 14 figures, 2 tables, 4 algorithms)

This paper contains 22 sections, 6 theorems, 35 equations, 14 figures, 2 tables, 4 algorithms.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. System Model: Wireless Blockchain Network
  4. Wireless Blockchain System
  5. Transaction Relay and Validation Mechanism for Wireless Blockchain
  6. Problem Formulation
  7. Adversary Model
  8. Dual Auction Mechanism for Wireless Blockchain Network
  9. Sybil-proof Incentive Mechanism Design
  10. First Stage: Relay Sub-auction
  11. Second Stage: Validation Sub-auction
  12. Performance Analysis
  13. Individual Rationality
  14. Incentive Compatibility
  15. Computational Efficiency
  16. ...and 7 more sections

Key Result

Theorem 1

The equation eq:Reward allocation holds if and only if $F_{r}^{g}\geq F_{r+1}^{g}+F_{r+1}^{g+1}$ holds.

Figures (14)

  • Figure 1: The relay and validation process in the complex wireless blockchain network.
  • Figure 2: Sybil attack mode in the relay process.
  • Figure 3: Comparision of the proposed dual auction and traditional auction.
  • Figure 4: The process of relay sub-auction.
  • Figure 5: The process of validation sub-auction.
  • ...and 9 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (6)

  • Theorem 1
  • Proposition 1
  • Theorem 2
  • Theorem 3
  • Theorem 4
  • Theorem 5