Revealing the True Cost of Locally Differentially Private Protocols: An Auditing Perspective
Héber H. Arcolezi, Sébastien Gambs
TL;DR
This work addresses the gap between theoretical guarantees and practical privacy in Local Differential Privacy by introducing LDP-Auditor, a framework that empirically estimates the local privacy loss $\epsilon_{emp}$ via distinguishability-style attacks on LDP frequency-estimation protocols. It covers pure and approximate LDP protocols, and extends auditing to longitudinal and multidimensional data settings with novel attacks $\mathcal{A}^L$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\text{RS+FD}}$, respectively. The authors conduct extensive experiments across nine protocols, reveal gaps between $\epsilon_{emp}$ and the theoretical $\epsilon$, detect a bug in a Python LDP package, and provide open-source tooling for practitioners. This framework supports more informed parameter selection and highlights directions for designing tighter, more robust LDP mechanisms in real-world deployments.
Abstract
While the existing literature on Differential Privacy (DP) auditing predominantly focuses on the centralized model (e.g., in auditing the DP-SGD algorithm), we advocate for extending this approach to audit Local DP (LDP). To achieve this, we introduce the LDP-Auditor framework for empirically estimating the privacy loss of locally differentially private mechanisms. This approach leverages recent advances in designing privacy attacks against LDP frequency estimation protocols. More precisely, through the analysis of numerous state-of-the-art LDP protocols, we extensively explore the factors influencing the privacy audit, such as the impact of different encoding and perturbation functions. Additionally, we investigate the influence of the domain size and the theoretical privacy loss parameters $ε$ and $δ$ on local privacy estimation. In-depth case studies are also conducted to explore specific aspects of LDP auditing, including distinguishability attacks on LDP protocols for longitudinal studies and multidimensional data. Finally, we present a notable achievement of our LDP-Auditor framework, which is the discovery of a bug in a state-of-the-art LDP Python package. Overall, our LDP-Auditor framework as well as our study offer valuable insights into the sources of randomness and information loss in LDP protocols. These contributions collectively provide a realistic understanding of the local privacy loss, which can help practitioners in selecting the LDP mechanism and privacy parameters that best align with their specific requirements. We open-sourced LDP-Auditor in \url{https://github.com/hharcolezi/ldp-audit}.
