When Are Two Lists Better than One?: Benefits and Harms in Joint Decision-making
Kate Donahue, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias
TL;DR
This work analyzes a two-agent ranking framework where an algorithm reduces $n$ items to a top-$k$ set, and a human selects the final item, aiming to maximize the probability of choosing the true best item $x_1$. Using Mallows and Random Utility Models, it characterizes when the joint human-algorithm system outperforms either actor alone (complementarity), showing that for unanchored settings and certain $k$ (notably $k=2$ with equal accuracies), complementarity holds; with unequal accuracies, the human’s accuracy often has a larger impact. Anchoring the human on the algorithm’s ordering ($w_a>0$) generally destroys complementarity, with a complete anchor ($w_a=1$) making collaboration strictly worse than the algorithm alone; partial anchoring can still permit gain under small $k$. The paper also demonstrates that the observed complementarity phenomena extend to the Random Utility Model, suggesting robustness across permutation-generating processes. Overall, the results inform when collaborative filtering and human-in-the-loop decisions yield tangible improvements and when to avoid collaboration due to anchoring effects.
Abstract
Historically, much of machine learning research has focused on the performance of the algorithm alone, but recently more attention has been focused on optimizing joint human-algorithm performance. Here, we analyze a specific type of human-algorithm collaboration where the algorithm has access to a set of $n$ items, and presents a subset of size $k$ to the human, who selects a final item from among those $k$. This scenario could model content recommendation, route planning, or any type of labeling task. Because both the human and algorithm have imperfect, noisy information about the true ordering of items, the key question is: which value of $k$ maximizes the probability that the best item will be ultimately selected? For $k=1$, performance is optimized by the algorithm acting alone, and for $k=n$ it is optimized by the human acting alone. Surprisingly, we show that for multiple of noise models, it is optimal to set $k \in [2, n-1]$ - that is, there are strict benefits to collaborating, even when the human and algorithm have equal accuracy separately. We demonstrate this theoretically for the Mallows model and experimentally for the Random Utilities models of noisy permutations. However, we show this pattern is reversed when the human is anchored on the algorithm's presented ordering - the joint system always has strictly worse performance. We extend these results to the case where the human and algorithm differ in their accuracy levels, showing that there always exist regimes where a more accurate agent would strictly benefit from collaborating with a less accurate one, but these regimes are asymmetric between the human and the algorithm's accuracy.
