Divide-and-rule policy in the Naming Game
Cheng Ma, Brendan Cross, Gyorgy Korniss, Boleslaw K. Szymanski
TL;DR
The paper investigates multi-opinion dynamics in the Naming Game with committed agents, revealing a tipping-point where the largest committed group can rapidly dominate a population on a complete graph. It develops a mean-field framework for the original model, then introduces a recursive density-evolution scheme that compresses the exponential state space to a tractable set of variables, enabling analysis for arbitrary configurations. Agent-based simulations on ER, small-world, and scale-free networks validate the divide-and-conquer policy: distributing minority committed agents across many small groups lowers the critical fraction required for dominance, with network topology modulating the effect. These findings illuminate how divided opposition and network structure influence opinion dominance and offer a quantitative toolkit for studying real-world polarization and persuasion dynamics.
Abstract
The Naming Game is a classic model for studying the emergence and evolution of language within a population. In this paper, we extend the traditional Naming Game model to encompass multiple committed opinions and investigate the system dynamics on the complete graph with an arbitrarily large population and random networks of finite size. For the fully connected complete graph, the homogeneous mixing condition enables us to use mean-field theory to analyze the opinion evolution of the system. However, when the number of opinions increases, the number of variables describing the system grows exponentially. To mitigate this, we focus on a special scenario where the largest group of committed agents competes with a motley of committed groups, each of which is smaller than the largest one, while initially, most of uncommitted agents hold one unique opinion. This scenario is chosen for its recurrence in diverse societies and its potential for complexity reduction by unifying agents from smaller committed groups into one category. Our investigation reveals that when the size of the largest committed group reaches the critical threshold, most of uncommitted agents change their beliefs to this opinion, triggering a phase transition. Further, we derive the general formula for the multi-opinion evolution using a recursive approach, enabling investigation into any scenario. Finally, we employ agent-based simulations to reveal the opinion evolution and dominance transition in random graphs. Our results provide insights into the conditions under which the dominant opinion emerges in a population and the factors that influence these conditions.
