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Efficient IAM Greybox Penetration Testing

Yang Hu, Wenxi Wang, Sarfraz Khurshid, Mohit Tiwari

TL;DR

The paper tackles the privacy-sensitive challenge of detecting IAM privilege escalations by third-party services. It introduces TAC, a greybox penetration-testing framework that interacts with customers through a small set of queries, guided by a comprehensive Permission Flow Graph model and a GNN-powered RL query policy, to detect IAM misconfiguration-based PEs under a fixed budget. A dual-modeling approach—concrete and abstract IAM modeling—enables PE detection with partial visibility, while IAMVulGen provides large-scale synthetic benchmarks to train and evaluate the system. Experimental results show TAC achieving competitive or superior false-negative rates compared to whitebox baselines and significantly reducing the number of queries required, demonstrating practical privacy-preserving applicability for cloud security testing and third-party auditing.

Abstract

Identity and Access Management (IAM) is an access control service in cloud platforms. To securely manage cloud resources, customers need to configure IAM to specify the access control rules for their cloud organizations. However, misconfigured IAM can lead to privilege escalation (PE) attacks, causing significant economic loss. Third-party cloud security services detect such issues using whitebox penetration testing, which requires full access to IAM configurations. However, since these configurations often contain sensitive data, customers must manually anonymize them to protect their privacy. To address the dual challenges of anonymization and data privacy, we introduce TAC, the first greybox penetration testing approach for third-party services to efficiently detect IAM PEs. Instead of requiring customers to blindly anonymize their entire IAM configuration, TAC intelligently interacts with customers by querying only a small fraction of information in the IAM configuration that is necessary for PE detection. To achieve this, TAC integrates two key innovations: (1) a comprehensive IAM modeling approach to detect a wide range of IAM PEs using partial information collected from query responses, and (2) a query optimization mechanism leveraging Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to minimize customer inputs. Additionally, to address the scarcity of real-world IAM PE datasets, we introduce IAMVulGen, a synthesizer that generates a large number of diverse IAM PEs that mimic real-world scenarios. Experimental results on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks show that TAC, as a greybox approach, achieves competitively low and, in some cases, significantly lower false negative rates than state-ofthe-art whitebox approaches, while utilizing a limited number of queries.

Efficient IAM Greybox Penetration Testing

TL;DR

The paper tackles the privacy-sensitive challenge of detecting IAM privilege escalations by third-party services. It introduces TAC, a greybox penetration-testing framework that interacts with customers through a small set of queries, guided by a comprehensive Permission Flow Graph model and a GNN-powered RL query policy, to detect IAM misconfiguration-based PEs under a fixed budget. A dual-modeling approach—concrete and abstract IAM modeling—enables PE detection with partial visibility, while IAMVulGen provides large-scale synthetic benchmarks to train and evaluate the system. Experimental results show TAC achieving competitive or superior false-negative rates compared to whitebox baselines and significantly reducing the number of queries required, demonstrating practical privacy-preserving applicability for cloud security testing and third-party auditing.

Abstract

Identity and Access Management (IAM) is an access control service in cloud platforms. To securely manage cloud resources, customers need to configure IAM to specify the access control rules for their cloud organizations. However, misconfigured IAM can lead to privilege escalation (PE) attacks, causing significant economic loss. Third-party cloud security services detect such issues using whitebox penetration testing, which requires full access to IAM configurations. However, since these configurations often contain sensitive data, customers must manually anonymize them to protect their privacy. To address the dual challenges of anonymization and data privacy, we introduce TAC, the first greybox penetration testing approach for third-party services to efficiently detect IAM PEs. Instead of requiring customers to blindly anonymize their entire IAM configuration, TAC intelligently interacts with customers by querying only a small fraction of information in the IAM configuration that is necessary for PE detection. To achieve this, TAC integrates two key innovations: (1) a comprehensive IAM modeling approach to detect a wide range of IAM PEs using partial information collected from query responses, and (2) a query optimization mechanism leveraging Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to minimize customer inputs. Additionally, to address the scarcity of real-world IAM PE datasets, we introduce IAMVulGen, a synthesizer that generates a large number of diverse IAM PEs that mimic real-world scenarios. Experimental results on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks show that TAC, as a greybox approach, achieves competitively low and, in some cases, significantly lower false negative rates than state-ofthe-art whitebox approaches, while utilizing a limited number of queries.
Paper Structure (17 sections, 8 equations, 10 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 17 sections, 8 equations, 10 figures, 1 table.

Figures (10)

  • Figure 1: IAM config. example.
  • Figure 2: Modified config. in PE
  • Figure 3: PFGs of the example in Figure \ref{['fig:iam:rbac']}; use green for enabled permission flows, red for disabled ones.
  • Figure 4: The visible PFG.
  • Figure 5: Abstract state updates
  • ...and 5 more figures