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The Critical Node Game

Gabriele Dragotto, Amine Boukhtouta, Andrea Lodi, Mehdi Taobane

TL;DR

We introduce the Critical Node Game, a two-player simultaneous attacker-defender model on cloud-network graphs $G=(V,E)$ where defender and attacker select $x\in\{0,1\}^{|V|}$ and $\alpha\in\{0,1\}^{|V|}$ under budgets $D$ and $A$ to maximize payoffs $f^d(x;\alpha)$ and $f^a(\alpha;x)$. Nash equilibria of this integer-programming game are computed by a tailored ZERO Regrets algorithm that handles the parametrized knapsack structure and attack-uncertainty, yielding pure or $\Phi$-approximate equilibria. The cloud-specific payoff model assigns node-level values $p^d_i$ and $p^a_i$ with multipliers $\delta,\eta,\epsilon,\gamma$, aggregating to $f^d$ and $f^a$, and is validated on synthetic graphs and a real-world cloud network to demonstrate prescriptive security guidance under adversarial conditions. The work shows practical scalability, reports both exact and approximate equilibria, and suggests extensions such as richer attacker dynamics and MITRE ATT&CK-informed constraints to enhance realism and robustness of the security recommendations.

Abstract

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and cyber-security and aims to minimize the unexpected network disruptions caused by malicious cyber-attacks under uncertainty. Methodologically, we introduce the critical node game, a simultaneous and non-cooperative attacker-defender game where each player solves a combinatorial optimization problem parametrized in the variables of the other player. Each player simultaneously commits to a defensive (or attacking) strategy with limited knowledge about the choices of their adversary. We provide a realistic model for the critical node game and propose an algorithm to compute its stable solutions, i.e., its Nash equilibria. Practically, our approach enables security experts to assess the security posture of the cloud network and dynamically adapt the level of cyber-protection deployed on the network. We provide a detailed analysis of a real-world cloud network and demonstrate the efficacy of our approach through extensive computational tests.

The Critical Node Game

TL;DR

We introduce the Critical Node Game, a two-player simultaneous attacker-defender model on cloud-network graphs where defender and attacker select and under budgets and to maximize payoffs and . Nash equilibria of this integer-programming game are computed by a tailored ZERO Regrets algorithm that handles the parametrized knapsack structure and attack-uncertainty, yielding pure or -approximate equilibria. The cloud-specific payoff model assigns node-level values and with multipliers , aggregating to and , and is validated on synthetic graphs and a real-world cloud network to demonstrate prescriptive security guidance under adversarial conditions. The work shows practical scalability, reports both exact and approximate equilibria, and suggests extensions such as richer attacker dynamics and MITRE ATT&CK-informed constraints to enhance realism and robustness of the security recommendations.

Abstract

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and cyber-security and aims to minimize the unexpected network disruptions caused by malicious cyber-attacks under uncertainty. Methodologically, we introduce the critical node game, a simultaneous and non-cooperative attacker-defender game where each player solves a combinatorial optimization problem parametrized in the variables of the other player. Each player simultaneously commits to a defensive (or attacking) strategy with limited knowledge about the choices of their adversary. We provide a realistic model for the critical node game and propose an algorithm to compute its stable solutions, i.e., its Nash equilibria. Practically, our approach enables security experts to assess the security posture of the cloud network and dynamically adapt the level of cyber-protection deployed on the network. We provide a detailed analysis of a real-world cloud network and demonstrate the efficacy of our approach through extensive computational tests.
Paper Structure (22 sections, 6 equations, 2 figures, 6 tables, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 22 sections, 6 equations, 2 figures, 6 tables, 1 algorithm.

Figures (2)

  • Figure 1: The network operator collects monitoring data that feed the model. The provides the prescriptive cyber-security recommendations.
  • Figure 2: The network of \ref{['ex:example']}. The weights on the edges represent the amount of traffic exchanged between the nodes.

Theorems & Definitions (11)

  • Definition 3.1: Critical Node Problem
  • Definition 3.2: Critical Node Game
  • Remark 3.1
  • Definition 3.3: Nash Equilibrium
  • Definition 3.4: Approximate
  • Definition 3.5: Joint Outcomes Space
  • Definition 3.6: Price of Security
  • Definition 3.7: Price of Aggression
  • Example 4.1
  • Remark 4.1: Determining the criticality of the nodes
  • ...and 1 more